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Dissent is what rescues democracy from a quiet death behind closed doors.1
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I. Introduction
As the 21st century gets underway, governmental authorities appear to be undertaking 
increasingly unfriendly measures against citizens who take to the streets to influence policymaking. In 
some jurisdictions, for example courts have given authorities the green light to stifle speech by limiting 
access to public spaces.2 In one recent case involving the 2004 Republican National Convention in New 
York, a District Court judge seemed to be more worried about the condition of the grass in Central Park 
than the right of the citizenry to gather in a public space and conduct a rally.3 Particularly in this age of 
globalized media outlets and big-money political campaigns, which in concert tend to constrain 
considerably the range of debate on important issues,4 an important component of the health of American 
democracy is the ability of the general public – that vast majority who lack means to convey their 
message via the media or directly to lawmakers5 – to make their grievances known by taking to the streets 
without undue governmental hindrance. 
This escalating government clampdown on free expression, along with current trends toward 
privatization of public functions,6 governmental secrecy7 and gagging of citizens,8 should give anyone 
1
 Lewis Lapham, foreword to HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, THE ASSAULT ON FREE SPEECH, PUBLIC ASSEMBLY AND DISSENT: 
A NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD REPORT ON GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2 (2004).
2 See, e.g., United for Peace & Justice v. Bloomberg, 2004 NY Slip Op 24389 (N.Y. Gen. Term); Nat'l Council of 
Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
3 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
4
 Media consolidation recently has drawn criticism. A bid during 2003 by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) to allow large media companies to own television and radio stations and newspapers in the same cities 
provoked protests in more than a dozen U.S. cities, with marchers in Los Angeles displaying signs that read “No 
Choice, No Voice: Reclaim our Airwaves.” Furthermore, 750,000 Americans phoned, wrote, or e-mailed messages, 
arguing that the proposed rule changes would stifle diversity and are fundamentally anti-democratic (the FCC 
ignored these messages). Steve Barnett, Media: On broadcast: Hurrah for Jowell as she puts brakes on big media, 
THE OBSERVER, June 29, 2003, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Madison Smart Bell,  Have You 
Heard the New Neil Young Novel?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 33. (Musician Neil Young is “not the first or last to 
notice that if our world is significantly less free now than in the time of his youth[.] [I]t’s less because of 
government than the inert momentum of the increasingly monolithic media”). 
5 See infra notes 18; 60-73 and accompanying text.
6 See infra, part V. C.
7
 This nation now holds some trials in secret. One newspaper columnist points out that “a tiny group of fringe right-
wing lawyers” created secret and unaccountable military tribunals controlled by the White House that have proven 
“totally useless” in the war on terror but have “indelibly stain[ed] America’s reputation as a leader in democratic 
principles and endanger[ed] the lives of American prisoners of war in current and future conflicts.” Robert Scheer, 
The Man Behind the Oval Office Curtain, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at B11. Furthermore, In general, the federal 
government has been operating under ever-greater secrecy in recent years, especially since the Sept. 11, 2001 
terrorists attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. For example, the number of documents government has 
classified jumped forty percent between 2001 and 2003, while in 2003 only one fifth as many documents were 
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who favors governance by open democracy serious pause. Though perhaps not fashionable to emphasize 
in this era of magnified terrorism fears, evidence is abundant that the polity’s rights are steadily eroding. 
“The war on terrorism threatens to destroy the very values of a democratic society governed by the rule of 
law.”9 In light of recent mass arrests and secret detentions by the federal government, Judge Tashima, 
who was imprisoned along with other Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II in an 
internment camp in Arizona, said, “It’s happening all over again.”10 The intersection of the new repressive 
state apparatus spawned by the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on American soil and jurisprudence that confines 
where free speech may take place, argues Professor Mitchell, “portends a frightening new era in the 
history of speech and assembly in America.”11
Protecting core rights such as that of free expression is vital because “[s]ometimes a right, once 
extinguished, may be gone for good.”12 Recognizing that the right to free speech for dissidents is 
increasingly at risk in the United States, this Comment catalogs manifold methods the government has 
employed to constrain free speech and urges that courts not only serve as a bulwark against further 
erosion of public expression of dissent but endeavor to restore access to the public forum that recently has 
been lost. Part II surveys the background of the right of free expression, examining the traditional limits 
declassified as in 1997. Edward Epstein, White house takes secrecy to new levels, coalition reports, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, Aug. 27, 2004 at A7. “[President George W.] Bush has … presided over one of the most closed 
administrations in modern history, increasing the classification of documents and defending against any challenges 
to its secrecy. Early in his tenure, [former Attorney General John] Ashcroft issued a memorandum to other agencies 
of government promising to stand by any plausible refusal of a Freedom of Information Act request.” Administration 
Unbound, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 2, 2004, at 16A. In addition, hearings for immigrants caught up in sweeps 
following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks were closed to not only the news media and the public, but even the detainees’ 
relatives. Adam Clymer, Government Openness At Issue as Bush Holds On to Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at 
A1. The details of their arrest and even the number detained has been kept secret. Id. Bush also has kept under wraps 
presidential papers pertaining to his father, George H.W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan, robbing scholars and the public 
of valuable information. Id. In general, The Bush administration’s “penchant for secrecy … has been striking to 
historians, legal experts and lawmakers of both parties.” Id.
8 See infra, part III.
9
 Steve Hymon, Rights a Victim of Terror War, U.S. Judge Says, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at B3 (quoting United 
States Court of Appeals Judge A. Wallace Judge Tashima, speaking at a conference on the civil rights cases 
challenging the World War II-era internments)(internal quotation marks omitted).
10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Tashima also criticized the government for interrogating people 
based only on race and for conducting searches without probable cause of Internet, library and university records. Id. 
Another former detainee at an internment camp told the newspaper, “A lot of people now are governed by fear. 
There are friends of mine who say racial prejudice can be justified. … They really believe it. It’s scary the way 
things are going. But I think people are going to be outraged sooner or later.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11
 Don Mitchell, The Liberalization of Free Speech: Or, How Protest in Public Space is Silenced, 4 STAN. AGORA 1, 
*45 (2004).
12
 Doe v. Ashcroft, No. 04 Civ. 2614, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19343, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2004).
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of the public forum. Part III provides details and examples of the government’s increasing tendency to 
suppress dissident expression by deploying heavily armed police in demonstrations, committing violent 
acts against peaceful protesters, engaging in mass arrests, exaggerating the crimes charged against 
detained demonstrators, and holding those demonstrators for unreasonably long periods of time in 
ignominious conditions. Part IV examines how such government actions violate constitutional protections 
of speech by deterring participation in public debate. Beyond such street tactics, government in recent 
years has begun placing public fora off limits by forcing dissenters into protest pens, determining based 
on viewpoint where they may engage in political expression, or limiting the landscape of free speech via 
privatization schemes. Part V analyzes the First Amendment implications of such developments, and Part 
VI concludes that courts must defend the right to free expression by limiting or disallowing these 
governmental schemes that have the effect of limiting access to the public forum. 
II. Background
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution13 represents “nothing less than a 
celebration of the value of intellectual and moral autonomy.”14 The nation’s founders believed that only 
with the widest possible access to information would democratic government be possible.15 This belief 
reflects the self-governance theory underlying the First Amendment tradition, whereby free speech is 
viewed as an indispensable tool for governing a democracy because it facilitates the spread of political 
truth, and thus it receives heightened protection.16 A variation on this theory posits that the right of free 
13
 The First Amendment provides in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
14
 Sheila Suess Kennedy, Introduction to FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Sheila Suess 
Kennedy ed., 1999), at xviii. 
15
 Id.   
16
 “The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the most important purposes of society and 
government is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only through 
absolutely unlimited discussion, for … once force is thrown into the argument, it becomes a matter of chance 
whether it is thrown on the false side or the true, and truth loses all its natural advantage in the contest.” ZECHARIAH 
CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (2d prtg. 1969); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN 
OPEN SOCIETY 12 (1992). Professor Smolla lists five ways in which free speech is related to self-governance, 
through: participation (debating issues, casting votes, joining decision-making processes), the pursuit of political 
truth, augmentation of majority rule, restraint on “tyranny, corruption and ineptitude,” and societal stability. Id. at 
12-13. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing “a profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”).
Chris Ford, Submission, Reclaiming the Public Forum
Page 5 of 57
expression is needed for citizens to develop the intellectual tools necessary to assimilate and evalueate 
widely ranging viewpoints.17 Commentators additionally have cited as an underlying purpose of free 
speech the marketplace theory, by which truth competes in the marketplace with falsity and ultimately 
triumphs.18 Free speech also is often justified as an end, tied to human autonomy and dignity.19 Thus, 
under the self-fulfillment theory, even where one’s words may lack truth value or argumentative merit, 
free expression offers the speaker fulfillment through inner satisfaction and the realization of self-
identity.20 Whatever its true raison d’etre, free speech on issues of public concern has enjoyed protection 
for hundreds of years and has as its conceptual progenitor the right, developed in Medieval England, to 
petition government for redress of grievances.
A. The right of free expression: ancient roots
The right of free expression as a means toward affecting change in governmental policy well 
predates the founding of the United States. Some authors suggest that the 1215 Magna Carta, although it 
contains no language directly protecting free speech, contains the seeds that later flourished into support 
for free-speech rights.21 These seeds take the form of the right to petition the governing authority for 
17
 “By allowing for ambiguity and conflict in the public sphere, the First Amendment promotes the emergence of 
character traits that are essential to a well-functioning democracy, including tolerance, skepticism, personal 
responsibility, curiosity, distrust of authority, and independence of mind.” GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: 
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 7 (2004).
18
 “Truth has a stubborn persistence. Persecution may eliminate all visible traces of a truth, like the scorched earth 
after a napalm bombing. Yet truth comes back. … Cut down again and again, truth will still not be stamped out; it 
gets rediscovered and rejuvenated, until finally it flourishes.” SMOLLA, supra note 16, at 7.  However, Smolla argues 
that like economic markets, the marketplace of ideas suffers a bias in favor of the wealthy, who have greater access 
than the poor or disenfranchised. Id. at 6. See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market”). 
19 SMOLLA, supra note 16,  at 9.
20
 “It is a right defiantly, robustly and irreverently to speak one’s mind, just because it’s one’s mind.” Id.
21
 The most salient feature in its seeds-of-free-expression context is that the Magna Carta enunciates a limit on the 
power of the Crown. KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 1. “However unarticulated, there is in the Charter the principle that 
we today would call the ‘rule of law.’” A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA, TEXT AND COMMENTARY 23 (1998). 
“The very fact that the King was forced to agree to this declaration of rights and liberties set an example that could 
never be erased. In a later century when the Stuart kings, to cloak their tyranny, invoked the doctrine of ‘Divine 
Right,’ men could look back to Magna Carta as a reminder that free men are not obliged to allow themselves to be 
ground into the dust.” Id.
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redress, which finds reference in the Magna Carta22  but more direct support in later texts.23 Yet even close 
to the time of the Magna Carta, the right to petition the government for redress of grievances became a 
formal mechanism by which the disenfranchised could participate with the enfranchised in English 
political life.24 Not surprisingly, the right to petition got an early start in North America, codified in the 
Body of Liberties adopted in 1641 by the Massachusetts Bay Colony.25
Not unlike today’s demonstrators who take to the streets to protest war, economic injustice or 
environmental degradation, those who petitioned the government in colonial America were among the 
disenfranchised.26  Also like street marching today, petitioning in colonial times allowed even the 
disenfranchised to participate in political life.27 Furthermore, like some street demonstrations carried out 
by the disenfranchised or their sympathizers in the 1960s as well as more recently,28 petitioning during 
22
 According to one author who cites an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the right to petition predates even the Magna 
Carta, and while the King regularly provided redress, it was provided when beneficial to the King and under a very 
limited set of circumstances – namely in private disputes between property owners. Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigal 
Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2163, 2163 n.26 
(1998). Thus, this early petition for redress was not a means to bolster political rights or affect policy. Id. at 2163-64. 
On the other hand, the Magna Carta does provide, in Chapter 61, a means of petitioning by which barons could seek 
that the King abide by the Charter. See Id. at 2164 n.29 and accompanying text. The King and his counselors had 
discretion over how to treat petitions, but even those rejected or not acted on had to be read. Id. at 2168; see also
HOWARD, supra note 21, at 52, quoting the Magna Carta, ch. 61 (“[I]f We, Our Justiciary, bailiffs, or any of Our 
ministers offend in any respect against any man, or shall transgress any of these articles of peace or security, and the 
offense be brought before four of the said twenty-five barons, those four barons shall come before Us, or Our Chief 
Justiciary if We are out of the kingdom, declaring the offense, and shall demand speedy amends for the same”). 
23 E.g., the Bill of Rights of 1689, quoted in Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 667, 685. This bill gave subjects the right to petition the King, “and all commitments and prosecutions for such 
petitioning are illegal.” Id. at 685 n. 92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24
 Mark, supra note 22, at 2169. “In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, for example, an extremely wide band of 
English society participated in politics by petitioning for redress of grievances, without question a wider spectrum of 
society than that with the franchise. … A petition from a group of prisoners, for example, suggests a participatory 
consciousness that extended well beyond even that which underlies some quite modern concepts of 
enfranchisement.” Id. at 2169-70 (footnotes omitted).
25 See Wishnie, supra note 23, at 688. See also Mark, supra note 22, at 2177, which quotes from the Body of 
Liberties: “Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free shall have libertie to come to any publique 
Court, Councell, or Towne meeting, and either by speech or writing to move any lawfull, seasonable, and materiall 
question, or to present any necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information, whereof that meeting hath 
proper cognizance, so it [can] be done in convenient time, due order, and respective manner.”
26
 Wishnie, supra note 23, at 686-87. “Disenfranchised white males, such as prisoners and those without property, as
well as women, free blacks, Native Americans and even slaves, exercised their right to petition for redress of 
grievances.” Id. at 688-89 (footnotes omitted). 
27 Id. at 687. 
28
 See, e.g., Symposium, The First Annual Peter Cicchino Awards for Outstanding Advocacy in the Public Interest 
Pannel Discussion: A Defender of Humanity: In Honor of Peter Cicchino, 9 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 45, 47 
(2001).
Chris Ford, Submission, Reclaiming the Public Forum
Page 7 of 57
colonial times succeeded at effecting change to governmental policy.29 And, of course, the Declaration of 
Independence refers to unsuccessful petitions for redress from the King of England made “in the most 
humble Terms” but which “have been answered only by repeated Injury.” 30 Finally, the First Amendment 
itself provides for petitioning,31 yet although originally seen as central to the relationship between 
government and the governed, the courts (not to mention academics) historically have paid it scant 
attention.32 For practical purposes the First Amendment’s protection of petitioning has been subsumed 
into its defense of speech and the press.33 “[W]here once political speech had petitioning at its very core, 
and what we understand as speech and press stood at the periphery, now the core and periphery are 
reversed.”34
Giving historic context to and underlining the importance of free speech in America, colonists in 
the early 1720s, under the pseudonym “Cato,” wrote: 
Freedom of Speech is the great Bulwark of Liberty; they prosper and die together. And it 
is the Terror of Traytors and Oppressors, and a Barrier against them. … But when [free 
speech] was enslaved … [t]yranny had usurped the Place of Equality, which is the Soul 
of Liberty, and destroyed publick Courage. The Minds of Men, terrified by unjust Power, 
degenerated into all the Vileness and Methods of Servitude: Abject Sycophancy and blind 
29
 For example, more than half the statutes enacted in eighteenth-century Virginia began a petitions. Wishnie, supra
note 23, at 687.
30
 Declaration of Independence, para. 30.
31
 “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people to 
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis 
added).
32
 Mark, supra note 22, at 2155.
33 Id. at 2154, 2155-56. A narrow exception to this trend arose during the 1960s with the development of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, named for two Supreme Court cases, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Gary Minda, 
Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 905, 908-910, 913 (1990). Under this doctrine the Supreme Court, citing the right to petition as “an 
essential component of our representative government” under the First Amendment, immunized from antitrust attack 
petitioning (i.e. lobbying) by business special-interest groups even where the purpose of such petitioning is to 
restrain trade and even if the restraint causes an antitrust injury. Id. at 909-10, 913. Professor Minda questions the 
validity of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, however, because 
[t]he true threat to the values of free expression and representative government lies not with 
antitrust regulation of petitioning, but rather with antitrust immunity, which has allowed the 
political process to be overwhelmed by the excessive influence of corporate greed and private 
access. [¶] By immunizing government-petitioning cases under the Noerr-Pennington antitrust 
doctrine, the courts have allowed business interests to use political expression as a predatory 
strategy for capturing the benefits of regulation, thus threatening the political legitimacy of 
government.
Id. at 1028.
34 Id. at 2154.
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Submission grew the only means of Preferment, and indeed of Safety; Men durst not 
open their Mouths, but to flatter.35
Yet thinkers of the time frequently followed the teaching of 18th century English commentator 
Blackstone, whose conception of free expression consisted of barring government from prior restraint of 
speech while allowing subsequent punishment.36 Arguably it was this sort of thinking that underlay the 
passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798,37 which punished, inter alia, criticism of the 
government.38 These acts, passed amid a looming prospect of war against France, provoked immediate 
public furor.39 Thomas Jefferson assailed the constitutionality of the acts – and rightfully so, according to 
author Chafee – and when he became the nation’s third president in 1801, he pardoned all prisoners.40
Popular indignation with prosecutions under the acts destroyed the Federalist party, and Congress paid 
back all the fines.41
Despite all this, the United States Supreme Court never passed on the constitutionality of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts,42 and for nearly the first century and a half of its existence the Court expended 
little effort on examining or upholding speech or press rights.43 One reason the Court rarely reached First 
35
 Letter from Cato number 15, entitled “Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same Is Inseparable from Publick 
Liberty,” in Kennedy, supra note 14, at 15.
36 See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO 
JUDGE-MADE LAW 182-83 (rev. ed. 1994) . “The liberty of press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but 
this consists in laying no previous restraints on publications, and not in freedom for criminal matter when published. 
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to 
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the 
consequences of his own temerity.” Id. at 182 (quoting Blackstone’s COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1866)).
37
 Law of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Law of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
38
 The Sedition Act punished with up to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine any act wherein a person should 
“write, print, utter or publish … any false, scandalous or malicious” materials against the government, president or 
Congress of the United States with intent to defame them, bring them “into contempt or disrepute,” excite hatred of 
the people against them or “stir up” sedition. Law of July 14, 1798 §2, 1 Stat. at 596-97. Truth was a defense. Id. §3, 
1 Stat. at 597.
39 WOLFE, supra note 36, at 183. The passage of the acts represented the one instance from the founding of the 
nation until 1917 in which the government attempted to apply the doctrine of bad tendency, which punishes speech 
that tends to favor an enemy at war by creating disaffection in the country and discouraging men from enlisting in 
the armed forces. See generally CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 25-28. 
40 CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 27-28.
41 Id. at 27. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
42 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276. “Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack 
upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Act of 
Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional” Id.
43 E.g., WOLFE, supra note 36, at 183 (“The period between 1800 and 1919 was generally dormant for free-speech 
cases on the federal court level”). However, it is not as though the Supreme Court never referred to free-expression 
rights in the 19th century. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1873) (“The right to 
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Amendment questions during the 19th century is that the prospect of mob violence or economic 
punishment discouraged parties from going to any court to assert their rights to free speech, and thus few 
cases or controversies respecting speech made their way to the Supreme Court.44
Indeed, it was not until well into the 20th century that Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent in 
Abrams v. United States,45 presaged the Court’s modern tendency to give teeth to First Amendment 
protection of expression. Justice Holmes wrote, “I think that we should be eternally vigilant against 
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe. …”46 This dissent appeared in one among a 
series of cases in which various agitators against the draft for World War I or socialists who advocated 
violent overthrow of the government had been hauled into court for violating the Espionage Act of 191747
or a similar state statute, and their convictions had been upheld.48 Even in the 1925 case of Gitlow v. New 
York49, which serves as a free-speech milestone by holding for the first time that the First Amendment was 
“incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause50 and thereby to be applied to the 
states, the majority held that legislatures could prohibit classes of speech that they consider to be 
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances … are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876) (“The right of the people peaceably to 
assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the 
powers or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the 
protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States”).
44 See generally Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 268-70 (1986). For example, the New York Times in 1869 sent riflemen and machine guns 
to protect the Herald Tribune from a mob, and employers purportedly threatened to eliminate employees’ jobs if 
William Jennings Bryan was elected president in 1896. Id. at 268 n.21, 269 n.22. Nevertheless, evidence exists that 
newspapers did not exactly feel “shackled” by the Supreme Court’s 19th century free speech jurisprudence. Id. at 
270-71.  
45
 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
46 Id. at 630.
47
 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 219, amended by the Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75 § 1, 40 Stat. 553 
[hereinafter Espionage Act].
48
 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams, 250 U.S. 616.
49
 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
50 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the 
press – which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress – are among the fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by 
the States”). While debating the Bill of Rights, the House of Representatives approved a provision stating that "[n]o 
State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases." 
Gibson, supra note 44, at 268 n.18, (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 755 (J. Gales ed. 1834)). However, the Senate 
rejected the provision. Id. (citing 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1146 (1971)). 
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dangerous.51 Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, pointing out that “[e]very idea is an incitement.”52
This paved the way for the latter’s seminal concurrence in Whitney v. California.53 There, Justice 
Brandeis enunciated the clear and present danger test as a limit on government prosecution of speech, 
such that “only an emergency can justify repression.”54
Justice Brandeis further emphasized that those who won the nation’s independence believed that 
“without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine.”55 This call to limit 
government sanction of speech would not really strengthen until the 1960s.56 But during the Great War 
era, perhaps it was Learned Hand, sitting as a District Court judge, who most eloquently defended the 
right of free speech in an Espionage Act case wherein he issued an injunction requiring the Postmaster to 
distribute a magazine containing anti-war poetry, cartoons and other writings57 (and was overturned on 
appeal58): 
Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convictions it engenders, may in fact 
stimulate men to the violation of law. Detestation of existing policies is easily 
transformed into forcible resistance of the authority which puts them in execution, and it 
51
 “[W]hen the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that 
utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether 
any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive 
evil, is not open to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional and that the use of the 
language comes within its prohibition.” Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670.
52 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J. dissenting). (“Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted 
on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only 
difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm 
for the result”).
53
 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
54 Id. at 377.
55 Id. at 375.
56 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (enunciating the actual malice standard in 
defamation of public figures);  Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (teaching of the moral propriety or 
necessity of resort to force not sufficient for conviction); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning 
Ohio law punishing advocacy of violence as a means to achieve industrial or political reform). In Brandenberg, 
Justice Douglas criticized the courts for too readily punishing advocacy by characterizing it as a threat:  “When one 
reads the opinions closely and sees when and how the ‘clear and present danger’ test has been applied, great 
misgivings are aroused. First, the threats were often loud but always puny and made serious only by judges so 
wedded to the status quo that critical analysis made them nervous. Second, the test was so twisted and perverted in 
[Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)]  as to make the trial of those teachers of Marxism an all-out political 
trial which was part and parcel of the cold war that has eroded substantial parts of the First Amendment.” Id. at 454.
57
 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Chafee considers that during the World War I era, there 
was “no finer judicial statement” advocating the right of free speech than this from Judge Hand. CHAFEE, supra note 
16, at 46. 
58
 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d. Cir. 1917). 
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would be folly to disregard the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate 
agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard 
the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of 
free government. The distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought 
acquisition in the fight for freedom. …59
B. The need for free expression: the lack of alternatives
Certainly such an eloquent defense of free speech during wartime applies with no less force 
today, particularly where the current Administration portends a permanent war against terrorism. 
Engaging in political speech in the streets is worthy of the most heightened protection, especially because 
the mass media may not accurately reflect the voices of the public, and much of the public lacks access to 
the media.60 Indeed, for much of the 20th century the main avenues of protest – such as leafleting, 
picketing, rallying on public property and engaging in door-to-door advocacy – were geared toward low-
cost message-making, and courts’ First Amendment rulings sought to protect such methods,61 because  the 
financially flush enjoyed a built-in advantage of media access in getting their message across to a broad 
audience and potentially were able to exclude those without such means from public debate.62
Underscoring the importance to the less well-financed of street protesting, Supreme Court Justice 
59 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. at 540. Judge Hand further argues: “If one stops short of urging upon others that 
it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its 
violation. If that be not the test, I can see no escape from the conclusion that under this section every political 
agitation which can be shown to be apt to create a seditious temper is illegal. I am confident that by such language 
Congress had no such revolutionary purpose in view [when it passed the Espionage Act].” Masses Pub. Co. v. 
Patten, 244 F. at 540. 
60
 “[F]reedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one.” Seth F. Kreimer, Social Movements and Law 
Reform: Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 121-122 (2001) (quoting A.J. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 32 (2d rev. ed. 1975)). While media 
consolidation has put the lack of access in sharp focus, see supra note 4, it can hardly be said that this concern is 
new. Justice Douglas, dissenting in a 1966 trespass case, stated: 
The right to petition for the redress of grievances has an ancient history and is not limited to 
writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to appearing before the 
local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or Mayor. Conventional methods 
of petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off to large groups of our citizens. Legislators 
may turn deaf ears; formal complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic maze; 
courts may let the wheels of justice grind very slowly.
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-51 (1966) (citations omitted). In Adderly, Florida students were convicted of 
"trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent" for demonstrating against racism and other governmental 
policies on the grounds of a local jail. Id. at 40. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61
 E.g. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (protecting familiar methods “essential to the poorly financed 
causes of little people”).
62
 Kreimer, supra note 60, at 122. One book reviewer refers to “a world bought and paid for by big business, which, 
not coincidentally, can count on the corporate media to push anti-people agendas.” Marlene Webber, Kicking 
Against Them, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 13, 2002, at D14 (book review). A letter writer contends that members of the 
public will take to the streets when – as is now the case – they are “deliberately bypassed by those in power.” 
Postbag, Don’t be a stooge of globalization, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 3, 2000 (letter to the editor).
Chris Ford, Submission, Reclaiming the Public Forum
Page 12 of 57
Douglas noted that “[t]hose who do not control television and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise 
in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a more limited type of access to public 
officials. Their methods should not be condemned as tactics of obstruction and harassment as long as the 
assembly and petition are peaceable.”63
While it is true that the Internet has the potential to provide a low-cost medium for those with 
dissenting political messages to reach a broad audience, it has been found to serve more as a highly 
efficient organizational, research, and interpersonal communication tool than a replacement for the town 
square.64 Still, beyond doubt the Internet has allowed groups large and small representing the entire 
political spectrum the chance to make their views available to readers all over the world.65 And they have 
been able (so far) to elide government and media censorship in doing so.66 For protest groups, posting a 
Web site means giving readers a view of marches – and police reactions – that the broadcast media may 
ignore.67 Moreover, use of Internet chat rooms, e-mail and Web sites allows dissident groups to provide 
volumes of information (including, for example, complaints and court decisions) that would have been 
inconceivable without the computer-based medium. Groups, moreover, employ online resources to 
facilitate recruitment and mobilization.68
However, Professor Kreimer contends that for all its ability to move information and reach 
globally, the Internet has not developed into a cyber-town square.69 Primary among the reasons for this 
include what he calls the “digital attention deficit:” Dissident groups’ sites, no matter who 
comprehensive, exist in a world wide cacophony of billions of Web sites trying to attract readers with 
63 Adderly, 385 U.S. at 50-51.
64 See generally Kreimer, supra note 60; see also Frederick W. Mayer, Labor, Environment and the State of U.S. 
Trade Politics, 6 NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 335, 339 (2000).
65 See generally Kreimer, supra note 60, at 125. A good example of such a Web site may be found at 
http://www.indymedia.org.
66
 “Not only does the Internet allow insurgents to bypass the ‘soft’ censorship of the mainstream media, but it allows 
evasion of the more direct efforts at suppression of information by local, state or national authorities.” Id. at 127. 
Professor Kreimer cites as examples the Mexican Zapatista rebels’ ability to convey their accounts to the world, 
Vietnamese dissenters’ efforts to post banned novels, Serbian radio stations’ Web-based broadcasts to get by 
airwave jamming by the government, and the posting of a DVD encryption-decoding computer program. Id. at 127-
29. Similarly Matt Drudge’s efforts arguably dragged the mainstream media into full-scale coverage of the Monica 
Lewinsky sex scandal during the Clinton era, while “the seamy quality of the Starr report became impossible to 
disguise when the text of the report became available online.” Id. at 130.
67 Id. at 125, 126.
68 Id. at 131-37.
69
 Kreimer, supra note 60, at 140.
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only 24 hours in a day.70 Moreover, protest site publishers may be able to post links on portals that attract 
heavy traffic or host more easily found “sucks” sites,71 but these may not offer the impact of ground 
protests at prominent venues, such as the National Mall in Washington, which by their nature capture the 
public’s attention.72 “On the Internet, there are neither malls nor sidewalks.”73
While the argument is thus strong that the Internet has yet to and as it currently functions lacks 
the potential to serve as a substitute for the town square, even if it could, the Internet unlikely could 
replicate the emotive impact of street protest. Though his renown and expertise lay in copyright, Professor 
Nimmer wrote an appellate brief on and advocated at oral argument the value of emotive speech in an 
important First Amendment case, Cohen v. California.74 In Cohen, Justice Harlan adopted Nimmer’s own 
phrasing75 when he wrote:
[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot 
sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of 
individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically 
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be 
communicated. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, “one of the prerogatives of 
American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures -- and that means 
not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and 
without moderation.”76
Because the Internet cannot foreseeably duplicate a true public meeting place and the majority of the 
citizenry lacks meaningful access to the mass media, most political dissenters continue to face a lack of 
alternatives to the public forum to make their views known.
C. The public forum and its traditional limits
Whether bypassed by those in power, lacking alternate vehicles for message-making or simply 
outraged at ill-conceived government policy, citizens who take to the streets and other public spaces 
70 Id. at 142-43.
71 E.g. homedepotsucks.com, paypalsucks.com, halliburtonsucks.com. See Id. at 152-53
72 Id. at 147-48.
73 Id. at 148. 
74
 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning defendant’s conviction of disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket with the 
slogan “Fuck the Draft”); William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on 
Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1649, 1655-57 (1996).
75
 Van Alstyne, supra note 74, at 1656-57.
76 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-674 (1944)).
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utilize a forum traditionally dedicated to political expression. Though frequently recited in First 
Amendment literature, the words of Justice Roberts, penned in 1939 in Hague v. Committee for Industrial 
Organization,77 bear repeating here: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. 
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the 
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.78
While this proclamation of privilege should resonate like a favorite tune to the ear of any street 
demonstrator, one should note that Justice Douglas stressed in the same paragraph that citizen use of 
public streets and parks for free expression is not absolute, but relative, and may be regulated “in the 
interest of all.”79
Yet while recognizing a governmental prerogative to regulate in the interest of peace and order, 
Justice Douglas nonetheless admonished that government must not use “the guise of regulation” to 
abridge or deny free speech.80 Since Hague was decided the Court has developed a regulation scheme that 
categorizes the use of public spaces for political expression based on their relative availability to the 
public. Thus, the Hague court referred to what generally is known as the traditional public forum, the 
streets, sidewalks and parks found by the Supreme Court to be “natural and proper” places for political 
expression.81 These are places that “by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to 
assembly and debate.”82 The Court also has defined limited or designated public fora and nonpublic fora,83
77
 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
78 Id. at 515.
79 Id. at 515-16. The privilege “must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in 
consonance with peace and good order.” Id.
80 Id. at 516.
81
 In such places, “expressive activity will rarely be incompatible with the intended use of the property, as is evident 
from the facts that they are natural and proper places for dissemination of information and opinion.” Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 817 (1985) (citing Hague, 307 U.S. at 515) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
82
 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
83
 Limited or designated public fora include university meeting facilities and municipal theaters, places that the 
government deliberately has opened to expressive activity for limited time periods, for a limited class of speakers 
(e.g. student groups) or for a limited range of topics (e.g. school board business). The nonpublic forum category 
refers to government property not traditionally used or deliberately designated for speech activity. For example, 
courts have found post office sidewalks, airports, state fairgrounds, jails, military bases and a municipally owned 
pier to be nonpublic fora. For a thorough treatment of the public forum doctrine endowed with abundant case 
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but the focus of this comment rests on the traditional public forum to elucidate the ways in which recent 
government actions have sharply limited its availability for political expression. 
The extent to which the government is permitted to regulate speech in a public forum depends on 
whether or not the content is a motivation for the constraint. Content-based restrictions in public fora are 
sharply circumscribed and strictly examined.84 That government is barred from regulating speech based 
on its substantive content or its messages is “axiomatic,”85 and to be valid, a content-based regulation 
“must be shown to protect some vital state interest, or to prevent some clearly identifiable harm.”86 An 
egregious form of content-related regulation is that based on viewpoint.87 “When the government targets 
not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First 
Amendment is all the more blatant.”88
In contrast, where a regulation is justified without reference to the content of the expression, 
courts give government entities some leeway to constrain speech by imposing reasonable restrictions on 
the time, place or manner.89 The government's purpose is the controlling factor in determining such 
content neutrality.90 When the purpose served is unrelated to the content of the expression, a restriction 
citation, see Kevin Francis O’Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 LOY. L. REV. 411, 418-462 (1999); 
see also Knolls Action Project v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 771 F.2d 46 (2d. Cir. 1985).
84
 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45;  Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (state may 
regulate expressive content “only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state 
interest”). 
85
 Moreover, “[d]iscrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). Professor O’Neill lists five 
categories in which courts have found impermissible governmental acts that restrict speech based on content:
categorically suppressing or favoring a particular message; blocking access to a forum because of a speaker’s 
intended message; charging higher fees for certain speakers to use a forum (because the speech is likely to generate 
controversy and require more police protection); withholding a subsidy to which a speaker, but for her message, 
would be entitled; and altering a speaker’s message as the price of access to the public forum (such as when private 
parade organizers were required to include gay and lesbian participants who would convey a message that the 
organizers cared not to communicate). O’Neill, supra note 83, 429-433; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 
(government offends the First Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the 
content of their expression).
86
 Mitchell, supra note 11, at *15 (emphasis omitted).
87
 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
88 Id. “The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). 
89
 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Boiled down to its essence, the time, place or manner 
doctrine permits government to restrict speech to serve a substantial government interest but does not allow it to 
restrict more speech than necessary to accomplish that end. Kelly Conlan, The Orange Order Looks to the First 
Amendment: Would it Protect Their Parades?, 17 J. L. & POLITICS 553, 565 (2001).
90 Ward, 491 U.S. at 792.
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will be deemed content-neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others.91 The content-neutral regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest – in this context, meaning that the restriction need not represent the least-intrusive means but only 
that the governmental interest “would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation”92 – and leave 
open ample alternate avenues through which to convey the information.93 An alternative is not ample if 
the speaker is prevented from reaching her intended audience.94 The requirement that an alternative be 
ample is important, because the First Amendment “protects the right of every citizen to reach the minds 
of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.”95
III. Bullying With Billy Clubs: Government Discourages Participation
As discussed at length in this part, governmental agencies across the nation of late have 
undertaken extensive (and expensive) efforts that have the ostensible purpose of enhancing public safety, 
but in reality have had the effect of curtailing the ability of political dissidents to win the attention of their 
intended audience. Much as government officials in the late 18th and early 20th centuries were facing war 
when they passed laws clamping down on speech,96 federal and local leaders today refer to concerns about 
terrorism as reasons for seeking constraints on free expression. In addition to oft-times harsh treatment of 
91 Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning ordinance upheld as content-neutral even 
though it affected adult theaters differently than others, because the governmental purpose of its enactment was to 
quell undesirable secondary effects attending adult theaters)).
92 Id. at 791, 798-99. The validity of time, place, or manner regulations “does not turn on a judge’s agreement with 
the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government 
interests or the degree to which those interests should be promoted.” Id. at 800. (citing United States v. Albertini, 
472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). Additionally, the validity of a regulation “depends on the relation it bears to the overall 
problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government's interests in an 
individual case.” Id. at 801.
93
 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 801. See also Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 
1229 (9th Cir. 1990). “[A]n alternative mode of communication may be constitutionally inadequate if the speaker’s 
ability to communicate effectively is threatened. Restrictions have been upheld, for example, when [the challenged 
ordinance] does not affect any individual’s freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the 
same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited, and the [challenged rule] has not been shown 
to deny access within the forum in question.” Id. (citations, emphasis, internal quotation marks omitted)(alteration in 
original). See also Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1042 (7th Cir. 2002) (ample alternatives ineffective 
where author of book criticizing professional sports team owner prevented from reaching his audience by ordinance 
barring him from selling the book within 1,000 feet of the entrance to the sports venue during home games). “The 
alternatives require Herculean efforts by Weinberg or his customers to complete the sale.” Id.
94
 Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 Id.
96 See discussion of Alien and Sedition Acts and Espionage Act, supra Part II. A.
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street demonstrators,97 the government has, under the auspices of the war on terror, sought to permanently 
gag certain entities subject to Federal Bureau of Investigation searches.98 A New York District Court 
judge recently found the law prohibiting disclosure in such cases facially unconstitutional, commenting, 
“as our sunshine laws and judicial doctrine suggest, democracy abhors undue secrecy, in recognition that 
public knowledge secures freedom.”99
But beyond the federal government’s current obsession with secrecy is its concentrated and 
multifaceted assault on protesters and their use of public spaces to engage in political speech. As this part 
discusses in some detail, government agencies at the federal and local level intimidate protesters from 
participating, denounce them as violent often when such a description is unjustified, impede their entry or 
exit from demonstrations, assault them with chemical agents such as pepper spray, shoot them with so-
called “less-than-lethal” projectiles – not infrequently ignoring manufacturers’ suggested limitations on 
their use – round them up in mass arrests, seek exaggerated charges, and abuse them while they are in 
custody.
A. Denouncing the Participants 
Before demonstrators even show up for their rally, authorities frequently have already begun to 
denigrate or intimidate them.100 This takes the form of taunts, thinly veiled threats or apocalyptic 
predictions of demonstrator-derived violence. Sometimes officials seem to base these predictions on little 
more than evidence that isolated incidences of vandalism or infrequent cases of violence have marked 
previous marches in other cities. 
1. Protesters’ propensity for violence exaggerated
97 See infra, part III. B.
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003); Doe v. Ashcroft, No. 04 Civ. 2614, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19343, at 
*16-*19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2004).
99 Doe v. Ashcroft, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19343, at *143, *159.
100
 For example, prior to the Republican National Convention in 2004, New York City officials demonized and 
criminalized those who planned to engage in political protest and portrayed them “in the most negative light.” Class 
Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), para. 62 (internal quotation marks omitted) (on 
file with author). New York Police Commissioner Kelly made public statements about the threats “hard-core” and 
“dangerous” protesters posed to New York City. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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For example, based on disruptions caused by dressed-in-black anarchists, who constituted small 
percentage of the 20,000 marchers who protested globalization and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in Seattle in December 1999,101 the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) “painted a dire picture” of 
civil disobedience and mass protests prior to the Democratic National Convention scheduled in their city 
for August 2000.102 During a presentation to the Los Angeles City Council, the LAPD stirred fear of 
pandemonium by showing a dramatic video of the demonstrations in Seattle103 – the tenor of this video 
accurately could be compared to that of the famous anti-marijuana film “Reefer Madness.”104 One police 
official told the City Council, “We fully expect to be fully involved with mass arrests and civil 
disobedience ... on a level of what we saw in Seattle if not more intense.”105
Poking fun at the City Council’s concerns over protesters, a newspaper columnist wrote that city 
leaders, looking over their shoulders at Seattle, were “quaking with fear” over the prospect of the public 
101
 The Washington Post described the scene in Seattle as follows:  
Delegates who stepped out of their hotels Tuesday morning, the first day of the [WTO] 
conference, with freshly issued ID badges around their necks [exited their hotels to find that] 
throngs of chanting demonstrators had taken control of the streets of downtown Seattle. With arms 
linked, they formed tight human chains to block all entrances to the convention center where the 
meeting would take place. [¶] Downtown’s usual din of traffic was banished, replaced by the 
beating of protesters’ drums and a lone trombone’s wail, by chants and ‘60s rock tunes at peak 
volumes. Riot police marched in tight phalanxes, slapping their nightsticks against the sides of 
their boots. The sound was like massed jackboots on pavement.
Robert G. Kaiser & John Burgess, A Seattle Primer: How Not to Hold WTO Talks, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 12, 
1999, at 40. Most protesters left property alone, but a small group of youths dressed in black, faces covered with ski 
masks or bandanas, committed acts of vandalism, breaking storefront windows of businesses such as McDonalds 
and Starbucks and spray-painting slogans on buildings. Id. “Though more than 20,000 union members marched 
peacefully in Seattle that day, the world would see and remember the sporadic violence and the clouds of tear gas.” 
Id. The mayor of Seattle responded to these impromptu protests (other, sanctioned events took place at the same 
time in other parts of the city) by calling out the National Guard, covering every street corner of downtown Seattle 
with baton-wielding police officers “in head-to-toe black” who marched shoulder-to-shoulder and shoved 
demonstrators out of a 50-block zone of the city in which free speech effectively had been banned. Mitchell, supra
note 11, at *33, *35; Lynda Gorov, A Crackdown Calms Seattle Action Taken to Prevent Confrontation, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 2, 1999, at A1.
102
 Jeffrey L. Rabin & Tina Daunt, LAPD Seeks Reversal of Protest Site Designation, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2000 at 
B1.
103 Id.
104
 The author of this Comment, who was a newspaper reporter at the time, attended the City Council meeting at 
which the LAPD showed its fear-of-another-Seattle video, and saw the video.
105
 Chris Ford, Police Outline Plan To Handle Protest, L. A. DAILY JOURNAL, June 29, 2000 (on file with author). 
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relations fiasco that street-level political expression could bring.106 “With trembling hands, they're ripping 
up the Constitution and throwing it to the winds, a craven sacrifice to the gods of chaos.”107
2. Protesters depicted as “terrorists”
Preparing to host the Republican party’s 2004 national convention, New York City officials, no 
doubt still haunted by images of the September 11, 2001 attacks on their city, understandably were 
concerned about a repeat during the GOP political event. However, their concerns over terrorist threats 
morphed into a practice of lumping demonstrators and terrorists together.108 The media gave voice this 
effort. A top police official, for example, was quoted as citing “terrorist threats and the escalating plans of 
anarchist groups to disrupt the city of New York.”109 A civil rights attorney told Newsday, “The context 
we’re now operating here in New York City is that protesters are terrorist threats, protesters are 
anarchists, protesters are the enemy.”110 Furthermore, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg presumed 
criminal intent on the part of demonstrators, making statements to the press that they “came here to get 
arrested.”111 Likewise, the mayor of Philadelphia anticipated the arrival of demonstrators to the 2000 
Republican National Convention by belittling them, calling them “idiots,”112 then issued his warning: 
“Some will come here to disrupt, to make a spectacle of what’s going on. They are going to get a very 
106
 Garry Abrams, Spines in Short Supply, Wimp City Faces Dreadful Electoral Pestilence, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, 
July 11, 2000 (on file with author).
107 Id.; The LAPD even went so far as to chop down trees for fear that protesters might set them afire and to remove 
newspaper racks from downtown Los Angeles in case they might be used as battering rams. Todd S. Purdum, Police 
and Protesters Ready; Politicians Hope for the Best, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2000, at 22.
108 E.g., Bryan Virasami, GOP Convention Threats; Threats led to fingerprints; Top police official says terror fears 
convinced cops to verify IDs of hundreds held that week, NEWSDAY, Oct. 27, 2004, at A05. 
109 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Newsday also reported that police fingerprinted hundreds of protesters 
during the Republican National Convention “due to looming threats by terrorist and anarchist groups.” Id.
110
 Glenn Thrush, Mayor to ex-detainees: Plead Guilty, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 2004, at A15 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
111
 “The mayor … urged demonstrators not to fight their cases in court, despite the fact that many say they haven't 
done anything wrong – and out-of-towners who have pleaded guilty said they did so to avoid returning to New 
York.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The mayor’s comment “reflects a disdain for the principle that people 
are innocent until proven guilty.” Id. (quoting Donna Lieberman, executive director for the New York Civil 
Liberties Union) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mayor Bloomberg further made public statements that those 
engaging in free speech were “terrorists and guilty criminals.” Class Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York 
(S.D.N.Y. filed 2004) para. 62 (internal quotation marks omitted) (on file with author). 
112
 “We’ve got some idiots coming here. Some will whatever obnoxious things they want to say and go home.” 
BOGHOSIAN, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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ugly response.”113 While Philadelphia’s and New York’s mayors made no effort to hide their hostility 
toward free expression, a spokesman for the anti-terrorism section of the California Department of Justice 
recently was even more blatant, outright designating anti-war protesting as a form of terrorism.114
Similarly, police training in preparation for anti-globalization demonstrations that coincided with 
a 2003 meeting in Miami of Western Hemisphere leaders attempting to create a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) emphasized violent protests and gave little regard to protection of free speech.115 The 
media build-up the Miami FTAA protests emphasized the “anarchists, anarchists, anarchists.”116 The 
emphasis on  anarchists “contributed to a police mindset to err, when in doubt, on the side of dramatic 
show of force.”117 Disconcertingly, this mindset inhibited police from performing such basic tasks as 
assisting members of the public.118
However, politicians, police and the media are not the only ones who are quick to characterize 
citizens who go to public places and engage in political speech as hoodlums prone to violence. Sadly, this 
mindset crept into a federal court considering a motion by protest groups to enjoin the city of Boston, host 
of the 2004 Democratic National Convention, from forcing them to demonstrate in a protest zone so harsh 
that the court itself said it creates the “overall impression … of an internment camp.”119 Despite finding 
the protest zone to be “a grim, mean and oppressive place,” the court justified the city of Boston’s 
113 Id. at 21.
114
 “Mike van Winkle, the spokesman for the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center told the Oakland 
Tribune, ‘You can make an easy kind of a link that, if you have a protest group protesting a war where the cause 
that’s being fought against is international terrorism, you might have terrorism at that protest. You can almost argue 
that a protest against that is a terrorist act.’” James Bovard, Quarantining dissent: How the Secret Service protects 
Bush from free speech, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 4, 2004, at D1.
115
 “[Miami-Dade Police Department] spent 40,000 ‘work hours’ preparing for this event, yet the training materials 
in the  After-Action Report document little pertaining to the protection of citizen rights of free  expression.” 
Independent Review Panel of the Miami-Dade Police Department, The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)  
Inquiry Report 5, Sept. 20, 2004, available at http://www.miamidade.gov/irp/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) [hereinafter 
Miami report].
116 Id. at 6.
117
 The idea was “to preempt violence rather than being subject to criticism for avoidable injury and  destruction 
based on a reserved presence of police force.” Id.
118
 The report cites “failure by the police to respond appropriately to civilian  inquiries for  directions, street closings, 
and other assistance.” Id. Suspicion of protesters is not new in Florida; St. Petersburg police practices of 
photographing demonstrators and recording their license plate numbers while they marched were criticized in 1988 
for their chilling effect on free speech and assembly. Such tactics are similar to those the FBI allegedly used starting 
in 1981 in surveillance of groups opposed to U.S. policy in Central America. Stephen Koff, City police accused of 
spying at rallies, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 14, 1988, at 1.
119
 Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74 (D. Mass. 2004).
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security measures in light of the surmised potential for protesters to engage police in “hand-to-hand 
combat.”120
B. Penalizing the participants
The government arguably has tended to further chill expression and limit access to the public 
forum through intimidating and violent treatment of protesters, denial of access to public spaces or of 
ingress to and egress from marches, mass arrests that sometimes include bystanders not involved in 
political expression, and abusive treatment during detention.
1. Show of force intimidates
Police agencies prepare for demonstrations almost as though they are headed to war with a 
violent enemy rather than to into a public forum to ensure safety for First Amendment expression.121 For 
example, In Los Angeles in 2000, police projected their rough-and-ready image prior to the Democratic 
National Convention by staging a training for television cameras to film a mock containment of 
protesters.122 Protest planners became so frustrated by pre-convention harassment by police – who, for 
example, questioned them about their identification, told them walking the streets without identification 
was illegal,  buzzed their planning center with low-flying helicopters and taunted them with threats of 
raids on the planning center – that they sued the city of Los Angeles to get it to stop taking actions “aimed 
at chilling [their] speech.”123 During the convention, police, their uniforms bristling with pepper-spray 
canisters, tear-gas guns and other weaponry, menaced would-be protesters.124 The city sent overwhelming 
120 Id. at 67, 75.
121
 Chris Ford, Commission Praises LAPD for Handling of Protest Marches, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Aug. 23, 2000 
(on file with author). 
122
 Nicholas Riccardi & Jeffrey L. Rabin, Protesters Say L.A. Will Be Used as a Model of Injustice, L.A. TIMES, July 
13, 2000, at B1.
123
 D2K Convention Planning Coalition v. Parks, CV-00- 08556 (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 8). See Chris Ford, Lawyers 
Will Be Keeping a Close Eye on the LAPD, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Aug. 11, 2000 (“The complaint accuses the 
LAPD of carrying out an ‘intense, well-orchestrated campaign of intimidation and harassment’ and seeks a 
temporary injunction against the police actions…”) (on file with author).
124
 Ford, supra note 121. 
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numbers of heavily armed officers even to small gatherings.125 One Los Angeles City Councilmember 
noted, “There were demonstrations I was at where there were more police than demonstrators.”126
Police frequently project a menacing presence at demonstrations by showing up in heavy riot 
gear, which critics deride as “Darth Vader” uniforms.127 A Miami police review board, after examining 
how police handled the demonstrations during the FTAA meeting, conceded that “[t]he overwhelming 
riot-clad police presence, when there was no civil disturbance, chilled some citizen participation in 
permitted and lawful demonstrations and events.”128 At one point, Miami police in riot gear blocked 
access to a church service, even though there was no demonstration at the time.129
The intimidation of protesters is not always pressed at the tip of a billy club. In 2002 the Justice 
Department lifted restricted restrictions imposed in 1976 on the FBI, allowing it to spy on Americans’ 
everyday lives.130 The FBI encouraged its agents to enhance “paranoia” by increasing the number of 
interviews it conducts with anti-war activists.131 Doing so “will further service [sic] to get the point across 
that there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.”132
2. Use of force causes injuries
While the so-called Miami Model came in for some criticism from the police review panel, the 
panel’s report does not tell the full story. According to those present, Miami police employed extraction 
teams, described as squads of plainclothes officers in full body armor, “wearing ski masks, jumping out of 
125 Id.
126 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Another City Council member emphasized the heavy cost the city of Los 
Angeles bore to police the convention, calling it a “fraud on the taxpayers from the moment it started” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). City officials had estimated that the policing tab would be $8.3 million, but it reached 
nearly $36 million, with almost $10 going just to overtime pay for police officers. Id. The difference between the 
estimated and ultimate policing cost was “more than this city spends to fix sidewalks in the city, trim trees in the city 
and clean up every neighborhood in the city” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); The police presence during 
convention week was compared to that of an occupying army and criticized as “staggering, inappropriate and over 
the edge.” Chris Ford, Council Rails at Heavy DNC Police Presence, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Dec. 4, 2000 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (on file with author). 
127
 “Having witnessed the Chicago Police Department's outrageous overreaction to the minor protests of the Trans-
Atlantic Business Dialogue, I now know what it feels like to live in a police state. The horde of officers in their 
Darth Vader costumes dominated the streets, dwarfing and menacing the few hundred peaceful protesters.” Letters, 
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 18, 2002, at 34 (letter to the editor).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130
 Bovard, supra note 114.
131 Id. (quoting from an internal FBI newsletter) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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vans and dragging protesters off.”133 Others of these snatch squads would drag protesters behind three-row 
police lines, preventing legal observers from identifying the detainees and access to them by medics.134
Moreover, legal observers in Miami obtained arrest reports listing “brutality, beatings and such – tasers, 
wooden and rubber bullets, many cops beating one person, concussion grenades, electrical shields, etc.”135
In Los Angeles, the police department’s policy-making board questioned officers’ use of “less-
than-lethal” weapons at a demonstration against police brutality in October 2000.136 There, police shot 
demonstrators with weapons designed, according to their manufacturer, for use against “subjects heavily 
dressed and in a violent mindset.”137 Among the weapons used that day was one intended for use against 
armed or violent individuals and was described as “an excellent tool” for cell extractions or cellblock-
clearing operations in prisons.138
Police in Portland, Oregon used not only less-than-lethal weapons during a protest coinciding 
with a 2002 political fundraiser for President Bush, but also pepper spray.139 Police claimed that protesters 
were interfering with the ability of attendees to reach the site of the event and ordered the crowd to move 
back 120 feet.140 After demonstrators allegedly ignored the order, officers assaulted the crowd with pepper 
spray and shot crowd members with rubber bullets.141 Plaintiffs in the resulting civil rights lawsuit allege 
that officers sprayed peaceful protesters in the face with pepper spray and other chemical agents.142 Police 
forcefully blocked the exit of one family with small children, including an 11-month-old who had been 
133
 Christopher Getzan, Infamous ‘Miami Model’ of Protest Clampdown, Coming to a town Near You, THE NEW 
STANDARD, June 8, 2004, at
http://www.newstandardnews.net/content/?action=show_item&itemid=488&printmode=true (last visited Nov. 9, 
2004).
134 BOGHOSIAN, supra note 1, at 53. 
135 Id. at 54.
136
 Chris Ford, Panel Checks ‘Less-Lethal’ Weapons, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Dec. 20, 2000 (on file with author). 
137 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It should be noted that while the weapons are designed for use against 
“heavily dressed” subjects, October sun in Los Angeles typically generates summer-like temperatures – in fact, the 
average high temperature in Los Angeles in October is 78 degrees – so rarely is it necessary to be heavily dressed. 
See National Weather Service, Downtown Los Angeles Climate Page, 1921-2004 Data, Observed and Average 
Monthly/Annual, Max Temp, available at http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/lox/climate/cvc.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
138 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
139
 Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV-02-1448- HA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25685 at *2 (D. Ore. Sept. 8, 2003).
140 Id. at *2-*3.
141 Id.
142 See generally Second Amended Complaint, Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV-02- 1448-HA (D. Ore. Sept. 8, 
2003).
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sprayed, even though they were screaming in pain and attempting to seek medical attention.143 Police gave 
no warning before spraying the parents and their three children.144
3. Checkpoints and denial of access to public fora
During some events that have drawn strong opposition from protesters, police have erected 
barriers or thwarted public passage to spaces that clearly are public fora. For example, armed officers 
staffed checkpoints outside the FTAA meeting site in Miami, and several streets were off limits to anyone 
without meeting credentials.145 One reporter observed, “Security fences cut up downtown like a jigsaw 
puzzle, with numerous checkpoints.”146
Police in Los Angeles during the 2000 Democratic National Convention protests and at another 
demonstration later that year used a slightly different tactic, among others: blocking ingress to and egress 
from ongoing demonstrations in public places.147 A District Court found credible evidence that Los 
Angeles police “prevented people from joining [a] demonstration, standing on the sidewalk, or leaving 
the march for any reason, including to use the restroom or disperse [sic] leaflets.”148 These actions, the 
143 Id. In one incident, officers without audible warning “doused and soaked” protesters with pepper spray, aiming 
the weapons directly into the faces of the protesters, causing one extreme pain and chemical burns. Id. paras. 4.6-4.7.  
In another incident, the family with children ages 6, 3, and 11 months, concerned that they had been surrounded by 
officers as the demonstration wound down, sought to exit the protest area but were twice denied by police. Id. paras. 
6.4-6.6.  Later, an officer “took aim” at the mother and sprayed chemical agents into her face, also hitting her 11-
month-old child. Id. para. 6.8. The father was sprayed in the eyes, so both parents were debilitated and kneeling or 
prone on the ground in pain. Id. paras. 6.7, 6.9. Meanwhile, their three children were crying in pain and fear and left 
“unattended by their parents for a period due to the effects of the chemical agents and their parents’ incapacitation 
from the chemical agents.” Id. para. 6.9. The complaint further alleges that the Portland police officers’ assault on 
the demonstrators violated the First Amendment, stating, “[t]he mass spraying of chemical agents caused a large 
number of peaceful protesters to leave the area and abandon their lawful free speech and assembly activities.” 
144
 Ryan Frank, Maxine Bernstein et al., Cleanup, Questions Begin, THE OREGONIAN, Aug. 23, 2002, at A01. “There 
was no warning, no ultimatum, nothing,” the father told a newspaper reporter as he tried to comfort his wailing 11-
month-old son, whose eyes were red and swollen. “They picked the guy with three kids to spray first.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
145 BOGHOSIAN, supra note 1, at 44.
146 Id. (quoting John Pacenti, Miami Trade Summit Security Hailed, Reviled, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 22, 2003, at 
A1).
147
 National Lawyers Guild v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-01- 6877 FMV (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2003)(order granting in 
part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment) available at http://www.nlg-
la.org/NLG_v._City.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2004). New York police also have limited ingress to and egress from 
ongoing demonstrations. See Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *14-
*15 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
148
 National Lawyers Guild v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-01- 6877 FMV, at 10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2003) (order 
granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment). Plaintiffs, a coalition of protest 
groups and a human rights bar association, alleged that along with blocking ingress to and egress from 
demonstrations in August and October 2000, police improperly terminated permitted political protests “without 
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court found, permit a reasonable inference that police unconstitutionally chilled the demonstrators’ First 
Amendment right to free expression.149
4. Mass arrests, exaggerated charges
Also during events that attract large numbers of protesters, police have engaged in mass arrests or 
round-ups and have tended to file exaggerated charges – or even charges for crimes that do not exist –
against those arrested. For example, in New York during the 2004 Republican National Convention, 
police arrested more than 1,800, suddenly sweeping protesters, legal observers, members of the media 
and even bystanders from the street in orange plastic nets.150
In addition, while posting smaller numbers of arrestees, the Los Angeles police during the 2000 
Democratic National Convention carried out mass arrests, forcing detainees to wait hours to be processed, 
strip searching some of the detainees and filing charges that either were thrown out for lack of probable 
cause or were based on nonexistent law. An attorney representing a group of animal rights activists who 
cause,” used excessive force against those engaged free expression and drowned out participants’ speech by flying 
helicopters at low altitudes “without a legitimate law enforcement justification to do so.” Id. at 5. 
149 Id. at 9. A New York court related the account of a family whose participation a 2003 anti-war demonstration was 
effectively thwarted (and thus their expression chilled) through the use by New York City police of barricades and 
protest pens; trapped blocks from the event, the family decided to go home because the mother did not believe that 
“there was going to be any way ever of getting anywhere close to the demonstration.” Stauber v. City of New York, 
No. 03 Civ. 9162, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
150
 Virasami, supra note 108; Class Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York, (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004) paras. 87A., 
87B (on file with author). . (police used “orange nets[] to arrest groups of people lawfully standing on sidewalks in 
Times Square, including legal observers and members of the media”),  paras. 87C., 87D. (police used the orange 
nets to round up and arrest “individuals who were either  participating in, observing, or were merely in the vicinity 
of a march which began in  Union Square”), paras. 87E., 142 (one march had not even proceeded a full block when 
police officers surrounded more than 200 people, using the orange nets, and arrested them all, even though they had 
remained on the sidewalk without blocking it and had complied with police instructions), para. 161 (a group was 
assembling for a permitted march when a police officer screamed and officers rounded up the participants with 
plastic orange netting and handcuffed them), para. 185 (officers surrounded a group of demonstrators after an officer 
shouted, “Arrest them all!” The group included protesters “as well as non-protesting bystanders” (internal quotation 
marks omitted). See also Shiller v. New York, (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004)  para. 24 (on file with author). (“[a]t 
Convention-related demonstrations there were … mass arrests of people lawfully on public sidewalks or streets, 
with law-abiding demonstrators and innocent bystanders alike being swept up”); Another New York case arising 
from the 2004 Republican National Convention contains this account of a violent mass arrest:
[A] group of demonstrators carrying signs and playing drums and other instruments left its gathering place 
at the southern end of Union Square Park and proceeded north on Union Square East. They were followed 
by curious observers. After the police prevented the demonstrators and observers from proceeding north on 
Union Square East, the group moved east on 16th Street. Using mesh nets and large numbers of officers, 
the police then sealed off both ends of the block … and refused to allow anyone inside to leave. Many of 
those trapped between the police lines had been walking lawfully on the sidewalk, and some had not even 
been following the demonstrators but were simply caught in the crowd when the police sealed the entire 
block. Without giving any opportunity for people to disperse, the police began systematically arresting 
people on the block, throwing some people to the ground.
Dinler v. New York  (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004) para. 3 (on file with author).
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were arrested en masse during the Los Angeles convention characterized the round-up as “an unlawful 
effort to suppress expressions of dissent.”151
The forty-two animal rights activists were arrested after they marched into a commercial area of 
downtown Los Angeles and approached a jewelry store they mistook for a furrier while chanting that it is 
harmful to wear animal fur.152 The store owner became frantic and closed the metal security grate, 
prompting some to kick or bang on the grate.153 Police rounded up these protesters, sixteen of whom were 
juveniles, forced them against a wall with their hands up and later to sit in the hot sun and in a police bus 
for hours, and charged them with conspiracy to commit vandalism.154 A judge threw out the charges for all 
but two of them for lack of probable cause.155 In another incident shortly before the 2000 convention 
began, Los Angeles police arrested two young women who had been participating in the protest planning, 
handcuffed them, interrogated them and threw them into holding cells.156 Their alleged crime:
jaywalking.157
While police lacked probable cause to arrest the animal rights demonstrators, they charged a 
group of bicyclists with reckless driving, a violation that under California law does not apply to bike 
riders.158 Advocating the increased use of bicycles instead of cars, this group of 71 were bicycling through 
151
 “It’s very obvious what was going on here,” the attorney added. “They arrested these kids on Tuesday [the second 
of the four days the convention lasted] and they planned to hold them until Friday after the convention.” David 
Houston, Animal Rights Activists Plan to Sue City, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 22, 2000 (on file with author).
152
 Ted Rohrlich & Henry Weinstein, Convention-Related Arrests Cause Little Stir in Legal System, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 19, 2000 at A22. 
153 Id. Anne La Jeunesse, DNC Anti-Fur Activist Pleads No Contest, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Nov. 16, 2000 (on file 
with author).
154
 Houston, supra note 151; Anne La Jeunesse, Observers See Protest Photos Taken by Police, L.A. DAILY
JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 2000 (an ACLU attorney pointed out that police arrested legal observers and journalists along 
with the protesters, contending that the police were engaged in “a pattern to try to eliminate observers of their … 
conduct”)(on file with author); Susan McRae, Volunteer Cameraman Sees the Rougher Side, L.A. DAILY Journal, 
Aug. 18, 2000 (on file with author). A student filming the animal rights protest and subsequent arrest was clubbed 
by an police officer in full riot gear and not informed of the charges against him. Id.; Rohrlich & Weinstein, supra
note 152.
155
 La Jeunesse, supra note 154. Two others, who allegedly kicked the store-front grate, were charged with felony 
vandalism, and one of these later pleaded guilty to the charge. Id.; La Jeunesse, supra note 153.
156
 Ford, supra note 121.
157 Id. An ACLU lawyer commented, “Obviously, it’s unheard of for somebody to be hauled off to [the police 
station] and handcuffed … for jaywalking. This sort of repression of people for their political views is to be 
expected in a police state, but it has no place in a democratic country. …” Id.
158
 Flynn McRoberts, Dear Mother Tribune, Send Bail Money, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 17, 2000, at 17. Realizing 
that police had wrongly charged the bicyclists, the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office revised the charges to 
misdemeanor obstructing a public way and two traffic infractions. Id. 
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downtown Los Angeles as part of a sanctioned demonstration, when they suddenly were swarmed by 
motorcycle officers, who shouted, “Put your bikes down,” and subjected to mass arrest.159 All charges
were later dropped.160 Bicyclists in a similar event in New York in 2004 endured like treatment.161
5. Abuses in detention
The 23 women among the bicyclists in Los Angeles were strip searched twice – once after a 
judge already had ordered their release.162 Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputies walked the women, 
many in biking shorts and tank tops, right past holding cells filled with jeering male prisoners.163 They 
were taken to a chilly cinder-block hallway and ordered to face the wall and undress, whereupon 
“belligerent uniformed officers” conducted visual body cavity searches of the women.164 Los Angeles-area 
taxpayers shelled out $3.625 million to settle lawsuits that arose from this treatment.165 In 2003, FTAA 
protesters also were strip searched.166 They accused Miami jailers of violating their Fourth Amendment 
rights by requiring them to undergo strip and visual body cavity searches without reasonable suspicion 
that such searches would disclose contraband or weapons.167
159 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). McRoberts, a Chicago Tribune reporter who bicycled with the group 
known as Critical Mass to report on the event, further described the process: “With their hands on their holstered 
batons, officers in riot gear told us to get ‘up against the fence!’” Most officers acted professionally, but they “cuffed 
us behind our backs with hard plastic ‘flex cuffs’ and kept us at the fence under [an] overpass for an hour or so,” and 
made the group wait in a bus for another hour. Id.; “Out of the blue, they cornered the riders and ordered them off 
their bikes. … There was no warning, no message to disperse. It was very scary. I mean, we just went on a bike ride. 
How did we end up in jail?” Sue Fox, $2.75 Million Proposed for Cyclists Arrested in Protest, L.A. TIMES, March 
25, 2003, at B1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
160
 Fox, supra note 159.
161
 In New York during the 2004 Republican National Convention, once-cooperative police turned on participants in 
the bicycling event. Police “used orange nets to trap and arrest scores of people participating in [the] bicycle event 
that [police] had allowed to take place for nearly one and one-half hours before the mass arrests were made without 
warning.” Class Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004 para. 87A (on file with author). 
162
 Fox, supra note 159. Also after the judge ordered their release, the women participants were denied telephone 
calls and access to medication. Id. Even the judge himself could not resist over-restricting protesters by requiring as 
a condition of their bail that they refrain from riding bicycles, prompting criticism from a criminal lawyer. Rohrlich 
& Weinstein, supra note 152. “Ordering someone not to ride a bicycle has nothing to do with guaranteeing the 
person will appear in court,” the lawyer said. Id. The lawyer further questioned the constitutionality of the judge’s 
order that a bicycle messenger not ride his bike, because he is being deprived of his livelihood. Id.  
163
 Rohrlich & Weinstein, supra note 152. 
164 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Elizabeth Fernandez, Strip-search claims spur immediate outcry; Women's 
lawsuits inspire calls for reform, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 6, 2003, at A13.
165
 The women received $70,000 apiece and the men $5,000 each in the $2.75 million settlement with Los Angeles 
County. Fox, supra note 159; Fernandez, supra note 164. In addition, the City of Los Angeles paid $875,000 to 
settle a lawsuit from the same group of bicyclists based on lack of probable cause for their arrest. Council OKs 
Settlement Over Convention Protest, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B3.
166
 Haney v. Miami-Dade County, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19552, *4-*6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2004).
167 Id.
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Aside from strip searches, denial of access to medicine and phone calls,168 and being held beyond 
their release date, members of the public who have participated in political speech have been subjected to 
other abuses in detention, such as lack of access to restroom facilities and lengthy detention in cold, toxin-
suffused quarters.169 Protesters and others corralled in the orange nets and arrested in New York during the 
2004 Republican National Convention were hauled to Pier 57, a filthy bus storage and repair facility, 
where they allegedly were exposed to a variety of toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and substances for up 
to 50 hours.170 Environmental inspections of this facility in 2001 and early 2004 revealed a lack of fire 
protection systems, asbestos particles and “floors covered with black, oily soot.”171
The New York arrestees were caged in chain-link-fence enclosures topped with razor wire that 
did not have enough benches for sitting or sleeping, requiring detainees to rest on the grime- and 
chemical-covered floor, which caused them to get skin rashes and blisters.172 The facilities not only lacked 
adequate restroom facilities, but there was neither toilet paper nor a place to wash up.173 During the arrest 
process, demonstrators and bystanders were handcuffed for hours, causing pain, numbness and swelling, 
and denied access to restroom facilities and medical attention.174 Some plaintiffs contended that the city of 
168 E.g. supra note 162.
169 See supra, part III. B. 4.; Gorov, supra note 101 (Seattle police arrested hundreds, holding them “face-down on 
the wet streets, their hands bound with plastic handcuffs); Class Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York 
(S.D.N.Y. filed 2004) (on file with author). All arrestees were fingerprinted, even if accused of only minor offenses 
for which fingerprinting is not necessary. Id. para 64.
170
 Class Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), paras. 66, 78, 90, 95, 110, 126, 176, 
193 (on file with author). 
171 Id. para. 67.
172
 Moreover, although detainees were dressed for hot summer weather, the facilities were kept cold with fans 
blowing at top speed, and they were not given blankets or other means to keep warm. Id. paras. 67, 77, 78, 93.
173 Id. para. 93.
174 Id. paras. 92, 93 (plaintiff complained of handcuff tightness but officer said nothing could be done; she suffered 
three weeks of numbness, pain and swelling of her left hand), paras. 95, 96, 97, 98 (plaintiff a P.hD. and vice-
president at J.P. Morgan, was arrested while merely walking home from a bookstore and despite lack of probable 
cause for her arrest; officer told her, “Sorry but you were at the wrong place at the wrong time”; she suffered 
extreme pain in her shoulder and swelling in her hand due to the handcuffing),  paras. 102, 107, 108, 112, 113, 114, 
118, 119, 123, 124, 133, 134,  137, 138,  143, 144, 146, 151, 152, 173, 174, 177, 178, 182, 186, 191, 195 (extremely 
tight handcuffing for many hours caused plaintiffs extreme pain, discomfort and numbness); Diane Cardwell, 
Lawyers’ Group Sues City Over Arrests of Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at B3. (“marchers suddenly swept 
into orange nets, languishing for hours on buses in tight handcuffs without medical attention, and one woman, 
panicked, in convulsions after being corralled into a mass arrest as she walked to work”); see also Dinler v. New 
York  (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004) (on file with author);  Shiller v. New York (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004) (on file with author). 
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New York deliberately detained protesters and others for lengthy periods and could have processed them 
more quickly using existing booking facilities around the city.175
IV. Intent to Silence Implied: How Governmental Acts Chill Free Expression
The plaintiffs further asserted that the mass round-ups, arrests allegedly without probable cause 
and unnecessarily long detentions in cruel and inhumane conditions were intended “to punish and 
retaliate against individuals who were engaging in political protest.”176 Consequently, the city deterred the 
expression of core political speech.177
It is true that city officials need at least to be prepared to maintain order in case crowds – or even 
a small percentage of a crowd – should decide to abandon the peaceful methods that most tend to follow. 
The vast majority of protesters at the Seattle WTO demonstration in 1999 were peaceful, but a small 
contingent appeared willing to engage in property destruction.178 In New York in 2004, city leaders were 
attempting to ensure that the streets remain safe for city residents and visiting politicians alike, a concern 
overlain by the specter of a reprisal of the terrorist attack on the city on Sept. 11, 2001.179 But while a 
government justifiably concerns itself with public safety, it may not limit speech based on mere 
conjecture that vandalism (which courts, elected officials and the media frequently characterize as 
“violence”) or disruption might occur.180 “First Amendment jurisprudence teaches that banning speech is 
an unacceptable means of planning for potential misconduct.”181
175
 They further pointed out that in 1982 the city processed 1,600 demonstrators and released them the same day, 
often within several hours. Class Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004) paras. 63, 65 
(on file with author). 
176 Id. para 61.
177 Id.
178
 Kaiser & Burgess, supra note 101. 
179
 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
180
 “Although the government legitimately asserts that it need not show an actual terrorist attack or serious accident 
to meet its burden, it is not free to foreclose expressive activity in public areas on mere speculation about danger. 
Otherwise, the government's restriction of first amendment expression in public areas would become essentially 
unreviewable.” Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1228 (1990) (citations omitted).
181
 Service Employee Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Collins 
v. Jordan, 110 F.3d. 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1997)). “The law is clear that First Amendment activity may not be banned 
simply because prior similar activity led to or involved instances of violence. There are sound reasons for this rule. 
Demonstrations can be expected when the government acts in highly controversial ways, or other events occur that 
excite or arouse the passions of the citizenry. The more controversial the occurrence, the more likely people are to 
demonstrate. Some of these demonstrations may become violent. The courts have held that the proper response to 
potential and actual violence is for the government to ensure an adequate police presence … and to arrest those who 
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Therefore, the aggressive tactics undertaken by police, as well as governmental acts blocking 
access to the public forum, arguably violate this principle because they curtail free expression based on 
the possibility that mischief may erupt rather than based on actual wrongdoing by those engaged in 
political speech. Furthermore, the government’s ignoble and rough treatment of  dissidents likely violates 
the First Amendment by discouraging participation.
A. ‘Ordinary firmness’ standard
To successfully allege a First Amendment violation under such circumstances, a plaintiff 
must show that the defendant’s actions deterred or chilled the plaintiff’s speech and that the 
deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.182 While this 
requirement “might be read to suggest that a plaintiff must demonstrate that his speech was 
actually inhibited or suppressed, [the court] requires only a demonstration that defendants 
intended to interfere with [Plaintiffs’] First Amendment rights.”183 A court thus will examine 
“whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 
Amendment Activities.”184
The intent component of this principle was at issue in Mendocino Environmental Center v. 
Mendocino County.185 There, a bomb went off under the car of an environmental activist while she was 
driving it, severely injuring her.186 Police and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agents ascribed 
responsibility for the explosion to the activist and her passenger and released incriminating information 
actually engage in such conduct, rather than to suppress legitimate First Amendment conduct as a prophylactic 
measure.” Collins, 110 F.3d at 1372 (citation omitted).
182
 Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
183 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court looks to intent because “Because it would be unjust to allow a 
defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined plaintiff 
persists in his protected activity.” Id.
184 Id. (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1273  (1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002). It is settled law 
among federal appellate circuits that 
to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against an ordinary citizen, [plaintiffs] must show 
that (1) they were engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendants’ actions caused 
them to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage 
in that activity, and (3) the defendants’ adverse actions were substantially motivated against the 
plaintiffs’ exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.
Id.
185
 192 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 1999).
186 Id. at 1287.
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about them that later proved false; charges against the activists were never filed.187 They sued, alleging 
inter alia that the police and FBI agents conspired to falsely accuse them in connection with the bombing, 
chilling their First Amendment activities.188 The court found intent on the part of the police and FBI 
because their actions included describing the environmental activists as “members of a violent terrorist 
group”189 and spreading misinformation, evincing a desire to cast their group in a negative light and thus 
harm its activities.190
B. Applicability in protester cases
Following Mendocino Environmental Center, a federal court in Oregon concluded that a high 
school football coach’s abuses toward a student whose parents had complained of earlier mistreatment 
would lead ordinary people in their position to refrain from further condemnation of the coach’s practices 
to protect their son from further harm.191 Denying the football coach’s motion to dismiss, the court found 
that the coach had engaged in “verbal tirades and emotionally abusive conduct” toward the plaintiffs’ son 
and other players during a summer training camp.192 After the plaintiffs complained, the coach turned the 
student’s teammates against him, encouraged other parents to verbally attack the plaintiffs, and called the 
student into an equipment room, locked the door and verbally abused the boy.193
Many of the cases applying the “ordinary firmness” standard involve retaliation,194 but it has been 
followed recently in a protester case. A district court in Los Angeles found that the LAPD’s preventing 
ingress to and egress from demonstrations during the 2000 Democratic National Convention, blocking 
protesters from using sidewalks, and using low-flying helicopters that interfered with speakers’ ability to 
187 Id. at 1287-88.
188 Id. at 1288.
189 Id. at 1302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Note how law enforcement officials characterize the activists’ 
group – Earth First!, an avid environmental group known for acts of vandalism and civil disobedience – as a “violent 
terrorist” organization.
190 Id.
191
 Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin School District 23J, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (D. Ore. 2003).
192 Id. at 1123, 1124-25, 1130.
193
 The coach turned the teammates against the plaintiffs’ son by telling them (falsely) that his parents had accused 
him of racism. This is significant because the plaintiffs’ son was one of five African-American players on a team of 
120 students. Team members threatened the plaintiffs’ son with physical harm, chastised him and isolated him, and 
the coached harassed him during school hours in front of his friends. Id. at 1124. 
194 E.g. Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see Mendocino Environmental Center, 192 F.3d at 
1300 (collecting decisions). 
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communicate “permits a reasonable inference that [the LAPD’s] acts would deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from participating in future First Amendment activities.”195
If government intent to chill speech can be found when law enforcement officials call 
environmental activists “terrorists” and otherwise spread misinformation about their group,196 then intent 
to chill equally likely could be found when mayors and police officials liken protesters to terrorists and 
say they take to the streets to get arrested.197 If a person of ordinary firmness would be chilled from 
engaging in free speech because a coach is harassing her son;198 a partygoer would be deterred from 
protected expression because he was arrested after saying “I can’t believe what is happening” while 
police were breaking up a party;199 or a policeman’s paramour’s expression by way of operating topless 
bars is silenced by a mayor’s campaign against such bars and their owners,200 then surely assaulting 
demonstrators in the face with pepper spray, shooting them with rubber bullets, rounding them up in 
plastic orange nets and detaining them in substandard conditions201 would deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from returning to the streets to engage in protected expression. As mentioned, a court has found 
it plausible that some LAPD actions did just that during the 2000 Democratic National Convention. 
Therefore, even taking into account the need to maintain street order and security, the vast array of recent 
government actions taken against protesters described in Part III, supra, so chill expression that they 
readily could be found to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in future protected speech, 
and thus these actions arguably violate the First Amendment.
V. Fencing the Public Forum: Protest Pens, Viewpoint Exclusion, Privatization
195
 National Lawyers Guild v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-01- 6877 FMV (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2003)(order granting in 
part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment) available at http://www.nlg-
la.org/NLG_v._City.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2004).
196
 Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1999).
197
 See supra, part III. A.
198
 Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin School District 23J, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (D. Ore. 2003).
199
 Tatro v. Kervin, 41 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1994).
200
 Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74 (2d. Cir. 1998). To be accurate, the court here did not find a First Amendment 
violation – in part because the plaintiff’s 89-page complaint was “an omnium gatherum, obsessively repetitious, 
overwrought in tone, and organized like a front hall closet” – but it affirmed in part the lower court’s judgment 
denying the public official defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, giving the plaintiff 
another chance to replead “in a way that would organize the issues. …” See Id. at 82.
201
 See supra part III. B.
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Harsh street tactics are not the only governmental acts that have taken a toll on First Amendment 
expression. Government has further muted voices of dissent in public places by fencingn off key portions 
of the public forum, relegating dissenters to portions of the public forum that are less visible to the targets 
of their speech than portions accorded supporters of the government’s policies or non-allied members of 
the public, and outright yanking the forum for expression out from under the public’s feet through 
privatization.
A. Protest pens: the ghettoization of demonstration202
Protest pens, otherwise known as protest zones or demonstration zones, essentially are a legacy of 
the WTO protests in Seattle,203 and courts have split on the constitutionality of their use. The extent to 
which they keep protesters at a distance that hinders their ability to communicate their message, they have 
been struck down. For example, in Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States,204 the plaintiffs were a group of 
boaters who displayed their disagreement with U.S. military policy by displaying signs, having children 
sing anti-war songs, and conducting a theatrical production on their vessels in front of a San Francisco 
pier from which high government officials were watching a parade of Naval ships.205 The government had 
claimed that a 75- to 100-yard buffer around the pier imposed by the Coast Guard was needed to protect 
against terrorist acts.206 But the court found that the buffer zone was not narrowly tailored because it 
burdened “substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”207
The court found the government’s argument unpersuasive, because its references to terrorist or other 
violent incidents were unrelated to events in the San Francisco area (or even in the United States), and it 
upheld a lower court injunction limiting the buffer zone to no more than 25 yards.208
1. Protest zones found unconstitutional
202
 Mitchell, supra note 11 at *38.
203
 Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74 (D. Mass. 2004).
204
 914 F.2d 1224 (1990).
205
 The demonstrators parade in formation in pleasure craft ranging from kayaks to 30-foot boats while the Naval 
display takes place farther out in the San Francisco Bay. Id. at 1225-26.
206 Id. at 1227.
207 Id. at 1227 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). The Peace Navy’s message could 
not effectively be conveyed effectively at a distance of 75 yards, “because the audience on the pier could neither 
read the banners nor hear the boatload of children singing.” Id. at 1226.
208 Id. at 1226, 1227-28, 1231.
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Haunted by images of Seattle in 1999, Los Angeles officials the following year developed a 185-
acre security zone around the venue for the Democratic National Convention, relegating demonstrators to 
a protest pen 260 yards away.209 The court in Service Employee Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles granted 
the injunction that protest groups sought against the security zone because its vastness made it not 
narrowly tailored to serve the government’s significant interest in delegate safety and its distant protest 
pen did not provide an adequate alternate means of communication.210 “[A]lthough it may be more 
convenient for delegates to have exclusive access to the immediate area, convenience can never 
predominate over the First Amendment.”211
The court further noted that the time restriction against speech would have been “absolute” had 
the 185-acre security zone been built because it would have blocked expressive activities 24 hours a 
day.212 Acknowledging that content neutrality of the security area was not argued, the court nonetheless 
noted that it “ha[d] its doubts regarding the zone’s neutrality” because free speech would have been 
permitted in the zone only to those with access.213 The court in Stauber v. City of New York214 appears to 
share this view.215
The Stauber court also agrees that the use of protest pens is not narrowly tailored to serve the 
government’s interest in public order, because it places an unreasonable limit on the movement of 
209
 Service Employee Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
210 Id. at 971-72. 
211 Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 970 n.1.
214
 No. 03 Civ. 9162, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004)
215
 “Had the plaintiffs objected that particular police officers were making decisions relating to the provision of 
access information or to ingress and egress [to the protest pens used in a 2003 anti-war demonstration in New York] 
for reasons relating to the content of the demonstrator's speech, the objection would be appropriate. The plaintiffs, 
however, have made no such objection.” Id. at *60. Professor Mitchell expresses a similar view, offering the 
following provocative queries: 
If the streets ‘from time immemorial’ have been the place where people debate and discuss, 
protest and rally, then how is it that now it is only on some streets (or even some parts of the 
streets) where this is possible, while on other streets – the streets where the decisions are made 
that direct our lives – the right to dissident speech is outlawed outright? Indeed, in the end, isn’t 
protest zoning really just a way of controlling the content of debate without really acknowledging 
that that is what is being done, by, for example, privileging the right of WTO ministers to meet [in 
Seattle] and to speak over the right of protest groups to contest that speech?
Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39. 
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demonstrators.216 The New York Police Department (NYPD) has created large pens using interlocking 
metal barricades that run the length of the block and have an exit at one end.217 When a pen fills up with 
protesters, police physically close off the entrance and require participants to enter a pen farther from the 
center of the demonstration.218 The result is that protesters cannot leave the pens even to use the restroom 
or get food or water without risking separation from those with whom they attended; at times police block 
access altogether, driving people to give up and leave.219 Thus, some groups have tried to keep their events 
small and omit the use of a sound system as a means to avoid NYPD involvement.220 The Stauber court 
enjoined the NYPD’s use of the pens, because they unreasonably restrict access to and participation in 
protests.221
2. Hollow Victory: Dissenters reduced to negotiating for the public forum
Both the Stauber and the Service Employees Int’l Union courts reached the correct result by
finding that the cities’ practices unconstitutionally restricted free expression. However, the latter case, 
decided in 2000 just months after the WTO protests in Seattle, turned out to be a hollow victory for free-
speech advocates, argues Prof. Mitchell. While the Los Angeles protesters won the ability to demonstrate 
near the targets of their speech, the case leaves future groups in the position of having to negotiate with 
government officials over which part of the public forum the government will deign to let them engage in 
protected speech.222
For example, one protest group seeking to demonstrate on the Great Lawn in New York’s Central 
Park declined to engage in this sort of negotiating over geography, and the court refused to grant an 
216 Stauber, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *80. Because the court found the city’s restriction to be not narrowly 
tailored, it declined to reach whether the city provided adequate alternative means of expression. Id.
217 Id. at *6, *25, *26. Protesters are expected to assemble in the pens, which may hold about 4,000 people 
“shoulder-to-shoulder” per block. Id. at *25.
218 Id. at *25-*27.
219
 Furthermore, “once the pens are full and declared closed, people experience considerable problems getting out of 
the pens.” Stauber, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *26-*27 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004). 
220 Id. at *28.
221 Id. at *95.
222
“[A]dvocates of speech rights [must argue] the fine points of geography, pouring over maps to determine just 
where protest may occur. Protesters are put entirely on the defensive, always seeking to justify why their voices 
should be heard and their actions seen, always having to make a claim that it is not unreasonable to assert that 
protest should be allowed in a place where those being protested against can actually hear it, and always having to 
‘bend’ their tactics – and their rights – to fit a legal regime that in every case sees protest subordinate to ‘the general 
order’ (which, of course, really means the ‘established order’).” Mitchell, supra note 11, at *37.
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injunction overturning the city’s denial of a permit to use the Great Lawn for a protest against the 2004 
Republican National Convention.223 The court appeared almost huffy at the groups’ refusal to negotiate, 
stating, “Simply because Plaintiffs feel that no other location in New York City is worthy of their cause 
… does not make it so.”224 In another case, an organization of dissenters in Philadelphia found themselves 
in a position of having to negotiate with police and Secret Service agents for “the right to demonstrate on 
a public sidewalk” across the street from a facility that the president was expected to visit.225 And another 
group that did attempt to negotiate a protest route for the 2004 Democratic National Convention in 
Boston got stuck with a siting deal so raw that the court itself wrote, “A written description cannot begin 
to convey the ambience of the [demonstration zone] … a space redolent of the sensibility conveyed in 
Piranesi's etchings published as Fanciful Images of Prisons.”226
3. Protest zones upheld
Seemingly steeped in a deep fear that the public might disrupt the Democrats’ convention, the 
city of Boston put forth a cavalcade of restrictions that could serve as a checklist of schemes designed to 
abridge free expression. First, the city shut down a federal building adjacent to the convention venue, the 
subway, the principal railway station serving routes to other parts of New England, the Charles River and 
even an Interstate highway (from several hours before to some hours after the convention’s daily 
activities).227 On what limited number of public streets surrounding the convention site that were not cut 
off from public access the city placed a severe limit the number of people allowed to demonstrate.228
Because only a twenty-foot strip of a main street leading to the convention site was made available to the 
public and cut off from an area open to delegates and officials by an eight-foot-high fence covered with a 
223
 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
224 Id. at 271.
225
 Amended Complaint, ACORN v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446 (E.D. Pa. 
May 6, 2004).
226
 Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D. Mass. 2004).
227 Id. at 65. Surely, if all public transportation is shut down and auto traffic is compromised by actions as severe as 
freeway closures, fewer individuals inclined to express dissenting views will be willing or even able to transport 
themselves to the convention venue to protest.
228
 “Anywhere in the soft zone, leafleting and small stationary demonstrations of twenty persons or less may be 
conducted without a permit. Demonstrations of between twenty-one and fifty people require a permit.” Id. Police 
would not let any more than 12,000 in all the side streets combined. Id. at 66.
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material designed to prevent visibility, even those small groups in streets open to the public that were 
allowed to demonstrate were not seen by the delegates and officials on the other side.229
If that was not enough to deter those intent on expressing dissent, the worst of horrors was 
reserved for participants with the fortitude to enter the demonstration zone. “The [zone] conveys the 
symbolic sense of a holding pen where potentially dangerous person are separated from others … a place 
… not just on the wrong side of the tracks but literally under them.”230 Its capacity was a paltry 1,000 
people.231 The roof of the zone was at best as high as an adult stands and was supported by a “forest of 
girders,” and the tracks above were bedecked with razor wire and patrolled by armed police and National 
Guard officers.232 The portion of the zone that was not under the tracks was covered overhead by mesh 
netting.233 More significant than demonstration zone’s profoundly oppressive nature, however, was there 
was little chance that delegates would see or hear demonstrators, because the demonstration zone was set 
off by a double set of cement barriers, each topped by eight-foot chain-link fences.234 The outer fence 
covered with a mesh the stated purpose of which was to prevent liquids from being squirted into the 
protected area but which had the effect of impairing visibility and altogether preventing leafleting.235 This 
last effect of the city’s multitude of restrictions, that no one was able to pass leaflets to delegates and their 
guests, should fail constitutional scrutiny because “[f]eedom to distribute information to every citizen 
wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside 
reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved.”236
229 Id. at 65-66.
230 Id. at 74.
231
 The city had calculated that 4,000 would fit, but under questioning by the court conceded that it “must limit the 
capacity … to no more than 1,000 persons.” Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D. Mass. 2004).
232 Id.
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235
 “Delegates and invited guests arriving or departing via buses on the opposite or eastern bus row of the terminal 
will have essentially no visibility from or to the [demonstration zone] because of the distance and the mesh screen. 
By contrast, those arriving or departing via buses in the western row may be able to hear and, to some extent, see 
demonstrators in the [demonstration zone], depending on precisely which bus they take and whether they walk in 
relative proximity to the [demonstration zone] fence. It will be, however, completely impossible to pass a leaflet 
from … to a delegate or other [convention] guest, even one who wants to approach the edge of the [demonstration 
zone] to receive the literature.” Id. at 67-68.
236
 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
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Banishing participants behind a double fence that resembles a prison holding area goes well beyond the 
reasonable police and health regulations suggested by the Struthers court.237
Nonetheless, the Bl(a)ck Tea Society court upheld Boston’s security scheme238 even though it 
admitted that it could not find that the restrictions on prospective protesters were narrowly tailored239 –
and despite its acknowledging that the Stauber court “considered detailed evidence” before enjoining the 
use of protest pens in New York,240 and despite that it called the design of the Boston demonstration zone 
“an offense to the spirit of the First Amendment” and “a brutish and potentially unsafe place for citizens 
who wish to express their First Amendment rights,”241 To justify its decision, the court cited a 1986 case 
upholding barricades to protect those exercising their First Amendment rights “from those who would 
prevent its exercise.”242 The court also based its decision on “past experience at comparable events” such 
as the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles.243 These latter reasons do not provide strong 
support for issuing a ruling that the court admits falls shy of constitutional scrutiny, especially since 
newspaper accounts from Los Angeles in 2000 reveal that there were no major injuries and minimal 
property damage.244
237 See id. Struthers concerns an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of leaflets. If the state is 
constitutionally disallowed from prohibiting distribution of circulars door-to-door, id. at 149, then arguably it cannot 
with constitutional blessing completely prevent dissidents from passing handbills to important government officials 
and those to whom they are close.
238 Id. at 77. A more recent case distinguished Bl(a)ck Tea Society, finding that a regulation that kept demonstrators 
between 260 and 265 feet away from the targets of their speech was unconstitutional. Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass'n, 387 
F.3d 850, 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2004). The Kuba court found that the government’s interest in preventing traffic 
congestion and ensuring public safety significant but “less weighty” than the “substantial” interest found in Bl(a)ck 
Tea Society. Id. at 858 n.9 (citing Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004)).
239
 Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 75, (D. Mass. 2004).
240 Id. at 74.
241 Id. at 76.
242
 Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74, (D. Mass. 2004).(quoting Oliveri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 
607 (2d. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243 Id. at 75. The court also based its decision on affidavits from law enforcement personnel, though information 
given the court by the United States government regarding specific intelligence concerning security threats was kept 
under seal, and because the plaintiff was unable to confront the information, the court did not rely on in in making 
its decision. Id. at 75 n.2.
244
 The only injuries reported in Los Angeles were to demonstrators at the hands of police. See, e.g., William Booth 
& Rene Sanchez, 2,000 Rally in Streets Against Sweatshops, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 18, 2000, at A25 (“Dozens 
of protesters … have been struck by rubber bullets that police have fired into crowds twice this week”); Paul 
Pringle, Week of demonstrations closes with minor injuries, 190 arrests, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2000, at 
23A (“Some demonstrators threw rocks and bottles at the police. Officers dispersed the crowd with batons, pepper 
spray and rubber bullets, injuring numerous protesters and journalists”); see also Jim Newton, Police, Critics Clash 
Over Use of Force, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at A1 (“no serious injuries, a smattering of property damage”); V. 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, disagrees with this viewpoint, because 
it upheld the Bl(a)ck Tea Society court,245 and should be criticized for doing so. First, while it correctly 
characterized time, place or manner analysis as “intermediate scrutiny,”246 the court applied what sounds 
much more like a rational basis test.247 Secondly, the appellate panel raises the same concerns as the lower 
court did regarding harm done during past large gatherings such as those in 2000 in Los Angeles – which, 
as mentioned, amounted to practically nothing besides the injuries sustained by protesters and 
journalists248 –  yet it fails to list specific allegedly violent incidents to justify its concerns.249 Therefore, 
unlike the courts in Stauber and Service Employees Int’l Union,250 the Bl(a)ck Tea Party appellate court 
found that Boston’s security measures, “though extreme,” were narrowly tailored and left open viable 
alternative means of communication.251 This conclusion is open to question.252
B. Viewpoint discrimination in “pro-con” cases
Dion Haynes and Vincent J. Schodolski, Immigrants, the Rights of Workers Top Final Rally, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 
Aug. 18, 2000, at 15 (no reports of serious injury).
245
 Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
246 Id. at 12.
247 Id. at 13 (“We turn next to the City’s goal, mindful that the government’s judgment as to the best means for 
achieving its legitimate ends deserves considerable respect.”). 
248 See supra note 244.
249
 See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (“While a government agency 
charged with public safety responsibilities ought not turn a blind eye to past experience, it likewise ought not impose 
harsh burdens on the basis of isolated past events. And in striking this balance, trial courts should remember that 
heavier burdens on speech must, in general, be justified by more cogent evidentiary predicates. [¶] On this hastily 
assembled record, the quantum of ‘threat’ evidence was sufficient to allow the trier to weigh it in the balance”); Id. 
at 13 (“The City claims that the risk of harm was substantial. It designed the elaborate security measures here at 
issue in light of recent past experience with large demonstrations, including those at the 2000 Democratic National 
Convention in Los Angeles. The double ranks of fencing were meant to deter attempts to break through the fence; 
the liquid dispersal mesh was intended to protect the delegates from being sprayed with liquids; and the overhead 
netting was added to prevent demonstrators from hurling projectiles. Conduct of this type admittedly has occurred at 
a number of recent protests”). It should be noted that there was no report of attempts to break through the security 
fence in Los Angeles in 2000. On the other hand, author of this comment, then a reporter covering the 
demonstrations concerning the 2000 convention, interviewed one man who had been shot six times with plastic 
bullets for attempting to climb the fence to post a sign. The bullets caused quarter-size welts on his shirtless torso.
250 See supra part V. A. 1.
251 Bl(a)ck Tea Society, 378 F.3d at 14. 
252
 The alternate means mentioned by the court are dubious. Principally, the court said the delegates could get the 
dissidents’ message through the television, radio, the press, the Internet and other outlets. Id. But for reasons 
discussed in Part II. B., supra, these methods do not constitute a viable alternative for citizens of modest means and 
are no substitute for street advocacy. Professor Mitchell concludes, “[N]o matter what the courts say and no matter 
how carefully police and the courts together draw the lines of protest, creating a geography of rights … can be 
frankly oppressive.” Mitchell, supra note 11, at *42.
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Besides employing the constitutionally dubious tactic of corralling protesters into fenced-off 
cordon-sanitaires,253 government also has engaged in what can only be seen as obvious viewpoint 
discrimination254 by creating special protest pens into which dissidents are shunted that are distant and 
often hidden from the protesters’ target of speech while allowing demonstrators who favor government 
policy within view of elected officials. A variant from this “pro-con” approach is to simply banish all 
demonstrators of whatever stripe from the public official’s view while allowing those expressing no 
opinions to be located closer to the official.255 While this trend has accelerated where opponents of 
President George W. Bush’s policies have attempted to make their views known to the president, it has 
roots in the early Clinton administration.
In Johnson v. Bax,256 a critic of Clinton in 1993 stood at a New York street corner near where the 
president was speaking, bearing a sign that read “Mr. Clinton: STOP CAMPAIGNING AND LEAD!”257
Police told him he had to go to a designated protest zone, and when he resisted the police took away his 
sign, committing a “clear violation” of his free-speech rights.258 The critic made another sign, returned to 
the street corner, was again told to leave and didn’t, and was arrested.259 Police had set up “pro” and “anti” 
demonstration areas, with which the court had no quarrel, but because police, rather than the 
253
 Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39.
254
 Justice Kennedy reminds that viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form of content discrimination.” 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (“The principle that has emerged from our cases ‘is that 
the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the 
expense of others’”) (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)).
255
 This happened, for example, in Seattle following the 1999 WTO protests that were marred by a small minority’s 
vandalism spree. See supra note 101. Seattle’s mayor called in the National Guard to clear the streets, declared a 
state of emergency and closed public spaces in 50-block area of the city to all (including those who objected to 
WTO globalization policies) except residents, owners and employees of businesses, emergency personnel and, more 
interestingly from a viewpoint-discrimination standpoint, WTO delegates (presumably advocates of WTO policies) 
and shoppers (presumably voicing no opinion regarding WTO policies). Mitchell, supra note 11, at *33-*34. Thus, 
the mayor’s street-closure order amounted to a pro-con scheme whereby pro-WTO delegates (and those with no 
opinion) were allowed in the very public places from which WTO opponents were excluded. 
256
 No. 93 Civ. 3530, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8850, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (order granting preliminary 
injunction).
257 Id. at *2. 
258 Id. at *1-*2. “The fact that the destruction of Mr. Johnson’s sign was a violation of his First Amendment rights 
has not been disputed and the fact that police officers knowingly violated his right is evidenced by the professed 
inability of any of the officers to remember who took the sign.” Id. at *3-*4.
259
 The court also found the arrest a “clear violation” of the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Police claimed they 
arrested him for blocking the sidewalk, but the court found that the record “clearly refutes” the claim, in part 
because one of the officers gave testimony that “is not true.” See Id. at *3, *4-*5.
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demonstrators themselves, were the ones directing demonstrators into the pens based on the content of 
their speech, the court found the practice impermissible.260
The Bax court noted that while “spectators” who cheered in support were allowed to stand across 
the street from where the president, dissenters were kept at least 75 yards away at all times.261 This 
practice, the court indicated, appeared to be an unconstitutional discrimination, but the court was not 
prepared to rule on this issue.262 While the police in Bax kept dissidents 75 yards from President Clinton –
which would appear to be unconstitutional under Bay Area Peace Navy263 – the George W. Bush 
Administration has ordered dissenters much farther away – as much as a half mile away from where the 
president is speaking – while letting supporters or those expressing no opinion remain closer.264 Faithful to 
Orwellian tradition, these remote protest pens have been dubbed “designated free speech zone[s].”265
1. Dissenters Hidden from Presidential Motorcade
When Bush went to Pittsburg in 2002, for example, police cleared the motorcade path of all 
critical signs, while allowing supporters to line the route, and required dissidents to go to a distant 
baseball field that had been designated for them.266 Police confiscated the sign of one participant, who was 
arrested for disorderly conduct and detained until the president had left town.267 A court threw out the 
disorderly-conduct charge.268 During a hearing, the arresting officer admitted that he had been instructed 
by the Secret Service to direct some protesters but not others into the fenced-in zone.269 Regarding the 
zone, the arrestee later told Salon, “I could see these people behind the fence, with their faces up against 
260 Id. at *8.
261
 Johnson v. Bax, No. 93 Civ. 3530, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8850, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (order 
granting preliminary injunction).
262 Id. at *10.
263 See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
264
 “These zones routinely succeed in keeping protesters out of presidential sight and outside the view of them edia 
covering the event.” Bovard, supra note 114. 
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.; Transcript of Proceeding, Commonwealth v. Neel, (Oct. 31, 2002) available at 
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/neel-2002-10- 31.html#fn (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
268
 Transcript of Proceeding, Commonwealth v. Neel, (Oct. 31, 2002) available at 
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/neel-2002-10- 31.html#fn (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
269 Id.
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it, and their hands on the wire. … It looked more like a concentration camp than a free speech area to me, 
so I said, ‘I’m not going in there. I thought the whole country was a free speech area.’”270
The Pittsburgh case is not isolated. One protest group provided a court fifteen examples from all 
over the country.271 For example, two grandmothers were arrested for displaying handwritten signs critical 
of Bush, declining to go to a designated zone hundreds of yards from the entrance to the venue the 
president visited.272 In South Carolina, police arrested a man on “trespassing” charges for holding a “No 
War For Oil” sign among hundreds of Bush supporters.273 He had refused to remove himself to the 
designated zone a half mile from where Bush was to speak.274 The state dropped the trespassing charges 
because they do not apply to public property, but the federal government, undaunted, charged the 
defendant with entering a restricted area around the president of the United States, a rarely-enforced law 
carrying a penalty of six months’ incarceration or a $5000 fine.275 This could not be a clearer case of 
content discrimination, considering a police officer told the defendant, “[I]t’s the content of your sign 
that’s the problem.”276 Not only has the government engaged in blatant viewpoint discrimination by 
relegating dissenters to distant designated zones while allowing supporters and others to be within view of 
the president, police in once instance even forbade the media from entering a protest area to speak to 
dissidents and banned the latter from exiting the zone to express themselves to the media.277
2. Court declines to enjoin practices
In Philadelphia, a dissident organization sought to enjoin the government from keeping its 
members farther away from where the President was to appear than supporters were allowed to be.278 In 
once instance a police line blocked the dissenting protesters a third of a block from where a presidential 
270
 David Lindoff, Keeping Dissent Invisible, SALON, at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/10/16/secret_service/index_np.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
271
 ACORN v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2004).
272
 Bovard, supra note 114.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
277
 Bovard, supra note 114.
278
 ACORN v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446, at *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2004).
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motorcade was to pass while allowing supporters to stand closer.279 In another, police parked several large 
vans directly in front of dissenting protesters, ensuring that the president was unlikely to see them.280
Government officials in Philadelphia were subject to a consent decree issued in 1988 permanently 
enjoining them from barring leafleting and sign-carrying based on the messages communicated.281 The 
plaintiffs in ACORN sought declaratory as well as injunctive relief and an order requiring government 
officials to comply with the 1988 consent decree.282 However, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for 
lack of standing,283 despite conceding that the government “may indeed have violated” the protesters’ 
rights, because the latter failed to show a concrete likelihood that the government would violate their 
constitutional rights, and because they were unable to specify future dates and times of official events at 
which violations were likely to occur. 284
While the ACORN court denied a dissident group standing for purposes of an injunction, the court 
in Stauber v. City of New York285 found that the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) had standing 
by showing it had sponsored protest events in the past and planned to do so in the future.286 The Stauber
court further found that the plaintiffs in that case sufficiently alleged impairment for the purposes of 
standing by demonstrating that the challenged government practices “may prevent the NYCLU from 
expressing its message as forcefully as it would in the absence of the practices.”287 Clearly, the standard 
followed in Stauber – the requirement that plaintiff show that it is in the business of sponsoring political-
speech events and that the government may impair their expressions – is less stringent than the 
specification of future events by time and date required in ACORN, and thus Stauber enunciates the more 
correct and just standard. The ACORN court effectively concedes that its standard is unlikely to be met 
279
 Amended Complaint, ACORN v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446 (E.D. Pa. 
May 6, 2004).
280 Id.
281
 ACORN v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2004).
282 Id. at *3-*4
283 Id. at *7.
284
 “In my view, plaintiffs’ claims are too amorphous to be justiciable at this point in time” Id. at *5, *6-*7. 
285 See Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
286 Id. at *40.
287 Id.
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when it notes that the plaintiffs “usually cannot learn of the scheduling of such events in sufficient time to 
enable them to obtain judicial relief.”288
Moreover, the ACORN court appears to rely to an improper extent on the fact that Secret Service 
regulations forbid its agents from regulating speech based on viewpoint.289 The court then essentially 
instructs the plaintiffs to sue individual Secret Service agents over First Amendment violations,290 finding 
that “no useful purpose would be served” by entering a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Secret 
Service must not engage in viewpoint discrimination. But this finding is questionable, since in general 
“the internal guidelines of a federal agency, that are not mandated by statute or the constitution, do not 
confer substantive rights on any party.”291 Because the internal regulations of the Secret Service unlikely 
conferred rights on the plaintiffs, a useful purpose indeed would be served by issuing the declaratory 
judgment that the ACORN plaintiffs sought.
Courts in the future should not follow ACORN but look to Stauber for guidance. If courts follow 
ACORN, most protest groups will be unable to specify a future likelihood of viewpoint discrimination 
required by that court, despite the ample evidence that the Secret Service is engaging in a practice of 
banishing dissenters to remote fields or pens while allowing supporters much closer to the President. 
Furthermore, this is an issue that should be heard by the Supreme Court; otherwise, the president could 
elude dissenters by avoiding or rarely visiting those jurisdictions which through their equitable powers 
might forbid the Secret Service from violating the Constitution. Better still, Congress could accomplish 
the goal of requiring equal treatment of all who engage in political speech by passing a statute that 
punishes with incarceration or stiff fines government officials who discriminate by viewpoint.
C. Privatization: theft of the public forum
While determining whether an outdoor space is a street, sidewalk or park, and thus a traditional 
public forum, would not be thought to raise many questions, the advent of public-private partnerships as a 
substitute for public investment in a time of chronic government budget shortages has begun to blur the 
288
 ACORN v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2004).
289
 “[T]he Secret Service has elaborate written guidelines which specifically provide for non-discrimination on the 
basis of the views sought to be expressed by the protesters.” Id. at *6.
290
 Agents who violate Secret Service policy cannot successfully assert a qualified-immunity defense. Id. at *6.
291
 United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir. 1990).
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line between public and private spaces. While the Supreme Court is not likely to countenance an outright 
ban on expression in traditionally public places, it has allowed speech restrictions on private property, 
even if it is heavily trafficked by the public. For example, after Congress stripped certain free-speech 
activities from the Supreme Court building and grounds, the court responded by declaring the law 
unconstitutional when applied to the sidewalks surrounding the building.292 The court pointed out that 
there was no fence or other form of delineation that marked the sidewalks surrounding the court’s 
grounds as “some special type of enclave.”293 Congress “may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the ‘public 
forum’ status of streets and parks which have historically been public forums.”294
On the other hand, the Supreme Court treats private spaces differently. Despite the increased 
function of shopping malls during the late 20th century as a central gathering place for Americans, for 
example, the Court has ruled these private properties outside the scope of First Amendment protection. 
The court in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,295 for example, reversed an Oregon district court’s injunction 
prohibiting a shopping mall owner from interference with peaceful, noncommercial handbilling by draft 
and antiwar demonstrators, holding that a property such as a mall does not “lose its private character 
292
 “The public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds, in our view, are public forums and 
should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes.” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983). The 
statute at issue provided, “It shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the 
Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring 
into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” Id. at 173 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 13k, 63 Stat. 617). 
293 Id. at 180.
294 Grace, 461 U.S. at 180. (quoting United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 133 
(1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The inclusion of the public sidewalks within the scope of [section] 13k’s prohibition, however, 
results in the destruction of public forum status that is at least presumptively impermissible. 
Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment 
protection and will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts 
government property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression.  
Nor may the government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it 
within the statutory definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property.
Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, in dissent Justice Stevens counseled judicial restraint, contending that the court 
should not at all have ruled on the section 13k’s constitutionality, because the statute did not reach the activities in 
which either defendant allegedly engaged. Id. at 188-89 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One 
of the defendants was threatened with arrest for distributing leaflets and handbills, which has nothing to do with the 
display of “any flag, banner or other device” proscribed in the statute, because “only after the material left 
[defendant’s] possession would his message have become intelligible.” Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The other defendant did display a device, Justice Stevens reasoned, but because her sign merely recited verbatim the 
text of the First Amendment, it could not be said to have been “designed or adapted to bring into public notice any 
party, organization, or movement.” Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted).
295
 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
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merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.”296 In doing so it 
distinguished Marsh v. Alabama.297 Writing in 1972 for the four dissenting votes in Lloyd, Justice 
Marshall sounded a prophetic note when he concluded:
It would not be surprising in the future to see cities rely more and more on private 
businesses to perform functions once performed by governmental agencies. The 
advantage of reduced expenses and an increased tax base cannot be overstated. As 
governments rely on private enterprise, public property decreases in favor of privately 
owned property. It becomes harder and harder for citizens to find means to communicate 
with other citizens. …  When there are no effective means of communication, free speech 
is a mere shibboleth. I believe that the First Amendment requires it to be a reality.298
Four years later the court extended Lloyd and held that strikers were not allowed into a shopping 
mall to picket their employer, a shoe retailer.299 Nonetheless, some jurists have urged that because 
shopping malls do function as public gathering places, mall owners have a reduced expectation of privacy 
and must allow political expression.300 Answering the Supreme Court’s invitation to employ alternate 
analyses or read their own constitutions more broadly than the Supreme Court interprets the federal 
Constitution,301 a few states, namely California, Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania and Washington, have recognized a limited right to free expression at privately owned 
shopping malls.302 The California Supreme Court, for example, held in Robbins v. Pruneyard Shopping 
Ctr.303 that that state’s Constitution “protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised,” in privately 
296 Id. at 569. The court reasoned, “The essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting 
property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center.” Id.
297
 326 U.S. 501, 507- 08 (1946) (upholding the right to distribute leaflets in company-owned towns).
298 Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 586 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further advocated that the court continue to 
follow Marsh and hold that “the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in 
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it” 
Id. (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S., at 506) (internal quotation marks omitted).
299
 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
300 E.g. Eastwood Mall v. Slanco, 626 N. E. 2d. 59, 67 (Ohio 1994) (Wright, J., dissenting) Justice Wright advocated 
the application of a time, place, or manner analysis to achieve an appropriate balance between the mall owner’s 
property rights and the public’s free-speech rights. Id. The justice noted, “When one thinks about how a shopping 
mall actually functions, the enclosed common areas within the mall are comparable to the town square of yesteryear 
surrounded by downtown stores. … [C]itizens, because of the public nature of a mall, have a heightened expectation 
that they are permitted to engage in some forms of speech activities.” Id. 
301
 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982).
302
 O’Neill, supra note 83, at 455; Horton Plaza Associates v. Playing for Real Theatre, 228 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (Cal. 
App. 1986) (collecting decisions). Ten other states have not. O’Neill, supra note 83 at  455-56.
303
 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979). 
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owned shopping centers.304 Professor O’Neill predicted that because the First Amendment does not reach 
private spaces, the battle over the contours of speech-related access to the increasingly privatized public 
space will be fought on a state-by-state basis.305
1. Hoarding Horton Plaza
One such battle took place over Horton Plaza Park in San Diego, California.306 In an attempt to 
revitalize commercial activity in the downtown area, San Diego leaders permitted the development of a 
shopping mall adjacent to the park, which was to serve as the mall’s pedestrian entrance.307 To increase 
the odds of the malls financial success, the city altered the park’s landscaping and furniture – by 
removing benches and replacing lawn areas with prickly plants – with the purpose of making the park a 
less attractive to gather as a means of encouraging people to pass through Horton Plaza Park and into the 
eponymous shopping mall.308 Thus, the effect of the mall’s opening in 1985, as well as the owner’s goal in 
opening it, was to “move public life inside, to capture it really, for its own commercial interests.”309
In a nod to Pruneyard, the shopping mall owners set up a (highly restrictive) permitting scheme 
governing how political expression was to occur.310 The Playing for Real Theatre applied to perform a ten-
minute skit in the mall reenacting U.S. bombings in El Salvador that was to involve eight actors and 
304 Id. at 347. This is based on CAL. CONST art. I, § 2 (affirmatively granting every person the right to “freely speak, 
write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right”) and CAL. 
CONST art. I, § 3 (granting right to “petition government for redress of grievances”). See id. at 345, 346.
305
 O’Neill, supra note 83, at 456.
306 See generally Mitchell, supra note 11, at *17-*26; Horton Plaza Associates v. Playing for Real Theatre, 228 Cal. 
Rptr. 817 (Cal. App. 1986). 
307
 Mitchell, supra note 11, at *22.
308
 The redesign “simply made it impossible to hang out at the park.” Id.
309 Id. at *21-*22, *26.
310
 Horton Plaza Assoc. v. Playing for Real Theatre, 228 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Restrictions 
recited by the court include: 
(1) Only one permit to any one person or group or organization will be issued per day. [¶] (2) A 
permit shall allow the holder to use only the portion of center property expressly designated and 
specified in the permit. [¶] (3) The office of the Center manager shall have the power to deny a 
request for a permit if the manager in good faith believes the proposed Political Expression to be 
profane, indecent, disturbing, offensive, in poor taste, or otherwise not conducive to the controlled 
business environment of the shopping center. [¶] (4) The number of persons who may engage in 
Political Expression in the Center at the same time shall be determined by the owner. Such number 
shall be determined with reference to the space provided in the designated area and the number of 
separate groups engaged in such activity at the same time. In no event shall more than two persons 
from any one group occupy space in the designated area at the same time. [¶] (5) No permits will 
be issued between Thanksgiving and December 31st of any calendar year. 
Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
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include leafleting as part of the skit.311 The mall manager denied the request for the play but approved the 
leafleting.312 The theater group neither dispersed handbills nor put on the play, yet based on a tip from an 
unnamed police informant that the group planned to create a disturbance and engage in violence in the 
shopping mall, its owner sued the group, winning a preliminary injunction against any dramatic 
performances by the group and requiring 72 hours’ advance notice for any leafleting.313 The court in 
Horton Plaza distinguished Pruneyard and like cases, limiting their holdings to protect only leafleting 
and signature-gathering, and not “expressive conduct” such as putting on plays.314 The dissent in Horton 
Plaza chided the majority for upholding a prior restraint of political speech and for buying the story  
“based on double and triple hearsay statements” that the theater group planned to create a disturbance.315
Horton Plaza serves as a warning that creeping privatization of public spaces heralds a concomitant 
muting of dissenting voices.316
2. New York: the great grass debate
As the 20th century progressed, courts came to the conclusion that property rights, though vital, 
are not as important as personal rights when considering whether to rule in equity. Relatively early in the 
century a Texas court announced, “[P]ersonal rights of citizens are infinitely more sacred and by every 
test are of more value than things measured in dollars and cents.”317 The California Supreme Court toward 
the middle of the 20th century commented that treating property rights more favorably than personal 
311 Id. at 828 (Butler, J., dissenting).
312 Id.
313 Id. at 820, 821, 822, 828.
314 Id. at 824.
315
 “Chicken little and Henny Penny are alive and well,” dissenting Justice Butler added. Horton Plaza Assoc. v. 
Playin for Real Theatre, 228 Cal. Rptr. 817, 828, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (Butler, J., dissenting). Justice Butler 
further noted: 
Finally, this case comes to us in a plain wrapper. The content is sterile. [Defendant] Phipps and his 
Theatre cohorts did not protest the denial of the permit to put on the play and they did not leaflet 
as allowed by issuance of the second permit. Hearing bumps in the night, Horton Plaza seeks to 
exorcise phantoms of its imagination. Our review should await an actual controversy.
Id. at 832-833.
316 See Mitchell, supra note 11, at *26.
317
 Hawkes v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The powers of the courts to strike down an offending law are no less when the 
interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental personal rights of free speech and assembly”).
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rights bespeaks a doctrine “wholly at odds with the fundamental principles of democracy”318 – especially 
in cases involving First Amendment rights.319 This doctrinal development represented a move away from 
the common law requirement that plaintiff assert a property interest before court would grant an 
injunction.320 Yet in this nascent century where the rights of dissidents are concerned, what is old 
apparently is new again.
For example, the court in Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, which denied protest 
groups the use of the Great Lawn in New York’s Central Park, made extensive reference to the threat to 
the condition of the Great Lawn posed by a mass rally and appeared far more concerned about the 
condition of the grass than about the groups’ free-speech rights.321 The court expressly points out that the 
Great Lawn was restored in 1997 at a cost of more than $18 million.322 Whether the city got its money’s 
worth is questionable, because only after the restoration did the city impose restrictions on the size of 
crowds allowed in the park and the requirement that events be canceled if they take place during or 
shortly following rainy weather.323 What the court did not mention was some of the $18 million 
restoration cost came largely from private, corporate donors (who are allowed to use the Great Lawn for 
318
 Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 110, 117 (1947). Whether to grant equitable relief “should not in 
logic or justice turn upon the sole proposition that a personal rather than a property right is involved. … These 
concepts of the sanctity of personal rights are specifically protected by the Constitutions, both state and federal, and 
the courts have properly given them a place of high dignity, and worthy of especial protection.” Id.
319
 “When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of 
press and religion … we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. As we have stated 
before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment lies at the foundation of free 
government by free men.” Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (citation, internal quotation marks omitted). 
See also Robbins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979) (“the public interest in peaceful speech 
outweighs the desire of property owners for control over their property”).
320 See Hawkes, 265 S.W. at 237. (“The rule that equity will not afford relief by injunction except where property 
rights are involved is known chiefly by its breach rather than by its observance; in fact, it may be regarded as a 
fiction, because courts with greatest uniformity have based their jurisdiction to protect purely personal rights 
nominally on an alleged property right, when, in fact, no property rights were invaded. This is, in our opinion, as it 
should be”).
321
 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261, 262, 263-264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
322 Id. at 263.
323 Id. at 261, 263-64. The court, shown “dramatic photos” by city officials of a pre-restoration Great Lawn in a 
careworn state, appeared concerned that the park not return to those “dust bowl” days. Id. at 264 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). However, other park areas such as East Meadow offer all-weather capability. Id. at 262. The 
cancellation requirement in rainy weather for events scheduled on the Great Lawn is especially puzzling given the 
Central Park experiences frequent wet weather, averaging approximately an inch of rain a week during summer 
months. See National Weather Service, Normals and Extremes, Central Park, New York, 1869 to present, available 
at http://www.erh.noaa.gov/okx/climate/records/nycnormals.htm. 
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their large events, unless the grass is wet).324 In communicating with the plaintiffs, the city emphasized 
that underlying its use-restriction plan was that “restoration accomplished through significant public and 
private investment can be preserved.”325 Thus, while Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. is a decision ostensibly 
based on a time, place or manner analysis under which the court found the city’s restriction reasonable, 
the subtext of the decision appears to be that where private donors help or principally fund an 
improvement to a public park, their private functions will receive precedence over free-speech 
activities.326 Most disconcerting, however, is that the court seemed to bolster its decision not to grant an 
injunction on behalf of the plaintiffs that the city permit them to use the Great Lawn because to open the 
park to the dissident groups might encourage more people to attend their event.327 This approach appears 
to be little more than a pretext to quell dissent. After all, a primary function of a public forum such as 
Central Park is to accommodate political expression, and the city’s decision to close the park to 
expressive activity in part because opening the park might encourage more expression offends the very 
interest in free speech that a public forum is supposed to accommodate.
3. Leaving Las Vegas to the privateers
Much as New York City did in obtaining private money to refurbish the Great Lawn, Las Vegas, 
attempting to reverse the declining economic fortunes of its “frumpy” and dated downtown, redeveloped 
324
 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Complaint, Nat'l 
Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 04 Civ. 6602, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), paras. 8, 16, 47, 
59.
325
 Complaint, Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 04 Civ. 6602, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
para. 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
326
 City officials contended that the predicted 250,000 participants in the rally the plaintiffs sought to permit would 
“decimate” the Great lawn and require a lengthy closure. Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. 
Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). On the other hand, the city boasted in a press release cited in the opinion that 
the restored lawn “consisted of approximately twelve acres of ‘hearty’ Kentucky blue grass,” soil engineered to 
resist compaction and more than four linear miles of subsurface drainage infrastructure. Id. at 263. The plaintiffs 
challenged the propriety of the apparent partial privatization of Central Park: “Although the corporate donors may 
feel a sense of private ownership over the Park and do not want to be ‘paying’ to host a demonstration that may 
strongly advocate against their perceived interests the [Central Park Conservatory] may not act to deny protest 
permits on the Great Lawn in order to protect its relationships with such donors. The Park remains a public forum 
for all and is not privatized or subject to the discriminatory urges of [the conservatory’s] corporate sponsors.” 
Complaint, Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 04 Civ. 6602, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
para. 59.
327
 The court quoted this statement from plaintiffs at trial: “If this Court was to rule that the Great Lawn is not off 
limits for political legal mass assembly protest, there would be a surge of excitement and enthusiasm, and we don't 
know what the palpable impact of that would be ... a lot of people who might not at this moment think about coming 
to Central Park a week before would find a way to get there.” Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 
F. Supp. 2d 258, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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the area using a private-public financing scheme.328 The result, a five-block pedestrian zone closed to 
traffic, was dubbed the “Fremont Street Experience.” However, wishing to minimize interference with 
commercial activity such as shopping in the new pedestrian zone, the city outlawed various free-speech 
activities, including leafleting, solicitation and using a table set up in a public space for the purpose of 
distributing literature or collecting signatures (a practice called “tabling”).329 After police dispersed a 
small rally called to protest the restrictions, the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada sued.330
Of interest is that the district court declared the pedestrian mall a nonpublic forum, upholding the 
solicitation and tabling bans while denying summary judgment to the city on the leafleting prohibition 
because it probably violated the First Amendment even under the more relaxed standard of scrutiny for 
nonpublic fora.331 The lower court determined that the pedestrian mall was a nonpublic forum because (1) 
the city had created it for the purpose of stimulating economic growth and “not for the purpose of 
promoting expression”; (2) the $70 million that had been spent on the redevelopment project represented 
a “great expense”; and (3) the textured pavement and overhead canopy distinguished the redeveloped area 
from surrounding streets and sidewalks.332
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning, holding that the Fremont 
Street Experience was a public forum as are other commercialized pedestrian malls, such as the Venice 
Beach Boardwalk and Olivera Street in Los Angeles and Fisherman’s Wharf and Union Square in San 
Francisco.333 Although U.S. appellate courts apply “a jumble of overlapping factors” when determining 
public forum status, they typically consider compatibility of the uses of the forum with expressive 
activity.334 Public thoroughfares, such as the Fremont Street pedestrian mall in Las Vegas, are “inherently 
compatible” with free speech.335 Courts also seek to protect the reasonable expectation that speech will be 
328
 American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1077 (2004).
329 Id. at 1095, 1096.
330 Id. 
331 Id. at 1096.
332 Id.
333
 In such determinations, courts consider historical use. American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. City of Las 
Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1103-04, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1077 (2004).
334 Id. at 1099-1100.
335 Id. at 1101. 
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protected where, for example, a location in question is indistinguishable from other public fora.336 Even 
the use of distinctive pavement and landscaping is not sufficient to change the character of a public 
forum.337 The appellate court concluded, “The Fremont Street Experience is still a street.”338
More noteworthy, perhaps, than the court’s holding was that it echoed the concern voiced 31 
years earlier by Justice Marshall that as cities unresistingly are drawn down the path of financing public 
projects with private funds, citizens may encounter greater difficulty in effectively communicating their 
views.339 “Although governmental attempts to control speech are far from novel, they have new potency in 
light of societal changes and trends toward privatization.”340 Unfortunately, this new potency has had a 
negative impact on the ability of dissidents to express themselves, as seen with respect to the Great Lawn 
in New York341 and at Horton Plaza in San Diego.342
D. Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel: viewpoint discrimination meets privatization
While the Supreme Court in United States v. Grace cut short government attempts to destroy 
public forum status of places traditionally used as pubic fora, more recent attempts by private actors –
typically political campaigns – to temporarily privatize a traditional public forum by, for example, 
obtaining a permit to use a park for an event, have drawn mixed judicial responses.343 During such events, 
the campaign committee typically treats the park as though it were private property and excludes 
dissidents or conditions admittance to the venue on absence of support for the campaign’s opponent.344
Two cases, both arising from a Republican campaign rally using the public commons in an Ohio town,
demonstrate the split in authority concerning these viewpoint discrimination-meets-privatization schemes.
336
 “The recognition that certain government-owned property is a public forum provides open notice to citizens that 
their freedoms may be exercised there without fear of a censorial government, adding tangible reinforcement to the 
idea that we are a free people.” Id. at 1100 (quoting Int’l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
337 Id. at 1102.
338 Id. at 1103.
339 See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
340
 American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1077 (2004).
341 See supra part V. C. 2.
342 See supra part V. C. 1.
343 See generally O’Neill, supra note 83, at 459-462.
344
 Id. at 459. 
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In Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville,345 the campaign committee for then-President George H. 
W. Bush obtained a permit to use a park for a campaign rally and restrict entrance to those holding tickets 
to the event.346 A police officer and a Secret Service agent guarded each entrance to the fenced-off park, 
requiring entrants to set aside any signs whether favorable or unfavorable to the campaign.347 The 
plaintiffs entered with concealed signs criticizing Bush’s AIDS policy, and when they displayed the signs, 
a brouhaha ensued, resulting in their being taken out of the park and arrested on various misdemeanor 
charges.348 The Schwitzgebel court found that despite the issuance of the permit, the park at which the 
campaign held the rally was a traditional public forum, and the government could not convert it into 
something less protective of free speech.349 The court noted:
In essence, public fora serve as bulwarks protecting the right of all persons, especially 
those who have no access to any other outlet, to speak their minds freely. Courts must not 
allow the government to overcome the bastions protecting such an important right 
through so simple an exercise as the granting of a permit.350
Although the court found that when a permitted event, the admittance to which is restricted to 
ticket-holders, is held a public park, the park retains its public forum status, it nonetheless upheld the 
exclusion of  the plaintiffs from the event by applying what Professor O’Neill characterizes as a “tortured 
time, place, and manner analysis.”351 Following Saunders v. United States,352 the Schwitzgebel court found 
a significant government interest in preventing, by use of the permitting scheme, an individual from 
physically intruding on and interfering with another’s event to inject his or her own beliefs.353 It also 
sought by its ruling to avoid “cacophony” by barring opponents from events held in public fora.354 The 
345
 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
346
 Tickets generally were made available to whoever wanted them. Id. at 1211-12.
347 Id. at 1212. The campaign provided its own signs for participants to use during the rally. Id.
348
 The charges were later dropped. Id. at 1212-13.
349 Id. at 1216.
350 Id. 
351 O’Neill, supra note 83, at 461 n.262.
352
 518 F. Supp. 728, 729-30 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d without op., 679 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
353
 Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
354 Id. at 1219. In deciding that the permitting scheme was a valid time, place, or manner restriction on the plaintiffs, 
the court found content-neutrality because the issuance of the permit was not based on content of the speech 
involved in the event; once issued, the permit could be enforced “in a way that protects the expression of the 
permitted message, even to the exclusion of some other message.” Id. However, court here is allowing a government 
agency to issue a permit on a content-neutral basis that gives an entity the ability to take over a public forum and 
exclude speech on the basis of content in that public forum.  Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 
Chris Ford, Submission, Reclaiming the Public Forum
Page 54 of 57
court’s reasoning, however, flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open…”355 and that free debate may carry with it “verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.”356
Thus, the Schwitzgebel court’s justification for using a permit system to stifle dissent lacks validity. 
Essentially, government is using a privatization scheme to do an end-run around the First Amendment’s 
ban on viewpoint discrimination357 by handing a traditional public forum to a private entity that does the 
discriminating. This is a practice that courts should not countenance.
If the Schwitzgebel court came to an improper result even while reaching the proper finding that 
permitting the use of a park does not strip the park of public forum status, then the court in Sistrunk v. 
City of Strongsville358 failed even to reach an appropriate finding. In Sistrunk, a high school student was 
required to surrender her button showing support for Bill Clinton before entering the Bush rally. The 
court, analogizing to Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,359 found that 
the Bush campaign had a right to exclude the student’s button because requiring that the campaign allow 
her to wear it would unconstitutionally deprive the  campaign of autonomy over its message.360 The 
Supreme Court in Hurley enunciated the principle underlying the Sistrunk court’s decision when it ruled 
that Massachusetts could not require war veteran parade organizers to include in their Boston procession a 
gay-rights group that would have imparted a message in discord with what the organizers sought to 
communicate.361 The Sistrunk court likened the plaintiff in that case to the gay-rights group and the 
campaign to the veterans, reasoning that compelling the Bush campaign to allow the plaintiff to attend its 
rally wearing a Clinton button would be analogous to requiring the veterans group to permit gay-rights 
U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (state may regulate expressive content “only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly 
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest”).
355
 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
356
 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971). Within established limits these effects are, the court added, “in 
truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. 
That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.” 
Id. at 25.
357
 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993).
358
 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996).
359
 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
360 Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 200.
361
 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559, 574 (1995).
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activists to march in the Boston parade, because “participating in the rally as a member of the audience is 
more akin to marching in the parade itself as one of the less visible marchers.”362
This analysis, however, “turned the narrow holding in Hurley on its head,” the Sistrunk dissent 
contended.363 According to the dissent’s view, the Sistrunk plaintiff’s attendance at the rally is not akin to 
marching in the parade but to standing in the crowd lining the parade route; marching in the parade, 
instead, is equivalent to standing at the podium and speaking at the rally.364 The dissent in Sistrunk
promotes the better view, because an audience member at a rally wearing a campaign opponent’s button 
or even carrying a sign has no more effect on the message the speaker at the podium conveys than a 
dissenter standing along a parade route, who is part of the parade’s audience.365 More significantly, the 
fundamental question in Sistrunk was “how much control over a traditional public forum a municipality 
may cede to a private group.”366 The Strongsville, Ohio, campaign rally cases thus present an intriguing 
question of whether in temporarily privatizing a public forum by issuing a permit to a political speaker, a 
government entity is able turn the public forum into a location where viewpoint discrimination can take 
place. Considering the extent to which courts protect free expression in public fora and the proposition 
that “the nature of certain public forums cannot be altered, either by government fiat or by private will,”367
the answer to this question should be a resounding “no.”
VI. Conclusion
In its frenzied rush to fortify its bellicose foreign policy, the government in recent years has 
turned a cold shoulder towards not only dissenters, but the teachings of earlier generations of American 
jurists. Not all modern thinkers are guilty of following this trend, however, as a New York judge recently 
noted, “We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it 
362 Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 199. The court further supported the proposition that the campaign could exclude dissenting 
voices from the public forum they occupied by finding that the campaign sought attendees to “send the media a 
message” that Bush was going to win the election. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
363 Id. at 200 (Spiegel, J., dissenting).
364 Id. at 201.
365
 See id.
366
 The record was not sufficient to determine this issue. Id. at 202, 203. 
367 Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 202 (quoting Bishop v. Reagan-Bush ’84, No. 86-3287, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6669, at * 6 
(6th Cir. May 22, 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.”368 Even – and especially – in wartime, the search for truth 
carried out through unbridled political expression and robust debate is critical to the continued political 
freedom of the nation. According to Justice Harlan:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse 
and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from 
the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced 
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately 
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other 
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which 
our political system rests.369
Concomitant with the right of free expression is that to gather in public places to give voice to 
political views such that they may be conveyed to authorities.370 In modern times, authorities demean 
public gathering for expression of political views by assuming such gatherings will take a violent form, 
thus presuming guilt until innocence be proven.371 It is argued that, ironically, the greater the constraints 
the government places on dissidents through penning protesters, discriminating by viewpoint and 
privatizing away the public forum, the greater the likelihood that the public may turn to civil disobedience 
– that is, law-breaking – to express views it otherwise would have voiced lawfully.372 Yet along with the 
general perils inherent in civil disobedience comes a newer, harsher threat of lengthy incarceration in 
federal penitentiaries should the government choose to employ section 802 of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(Patriot Act)373 against demonstrators. This prospect is no flight of fancy.374
The government already has so compromised the free use of the public forum that the only way to 
take it back may be through widespread civil disobedience. But because such a course would put many in 
368
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
587 (1952)).
369
 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).
370
 “The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably 
for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.” United States v. Cruikshank, 
92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876) (quoted in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 513 (1939)).
371
 Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39.
372
 Id. at *44 (“closing off space to protest has made civil disobedience all the more necessary…”).
373
 Public Law 107-56.
374
 Section 802 of the Patriot act reaches those who violate a criminal law in the commission of an act dangerous to 
human life the purpose of which is to influence government policy through intimidation or coercion. See Mitchell, 
supra note 11, at *44-*45; NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT 112-13 (2002).
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danger, and because in a civilized democracy the citizenry should not have to resort to such extremes to 
engage in speech activity the Constitution already protects, a better course would be to rethink current 
policy toward those who take to public places to express their political views. Courts no doubt have a 
significant role to play in this process and should remain astute to governmental attempts to displace 
dissidents by restricting access to the public forum. Specifically, courts should be particularly wary of and 
should treat with great suspicion schemes that (1) corral or pen protesters so they effectively are unable to 
get their message across to the targets of their speech, (2) discriminate according to viewpoint by 
banishing opponents of government policies to distant or unseen locations, and (3) propose to accomplish 
through privatization what the First Amendment otherwise would not permit. By remaining vigilant 
against such free expression-compromising schemes, courts can hold the other two branches of 
government to a constitutional standard so that the people of this country may reclaim the public forum.
